France, Spain, or Germany. By best estimate, they numbered only two to three thousand, down from a peak of some five thousand, in a population variously estimated in the range of two to three million. During the two centuries of their presence, Jews had settled in more than eighty locations, ranging from hundreds living in London, their initial place of residence and sole burial site until 1177, to isolated individual persons or single families living in peasant villages and some towns (Russell 1948; Mann 1986, 400; Mundill 1998, chap. 2). The majority lived in small communities numbering in the tens, rarely more than one hundred, that sustained a synagogue and a cemetery. Once ejected, Jews remained absent for nearly four centuries until they were invited back by Cromwell in December 1655.1

On the face of things, this history might not be grasped as very significant. Writing in this vein, Lionel Abrahams observed in 1895 that the “expulsion of the English Jews was an event of small importance alike in English and in Jewish history. In England the effect that it produced was barely perceptible.” The Jews, he further claimed, “were driven from a land which thirty-five years earlier they had begged in vain from being able to leave. . . . The loss of their inhospitable home in England was but one episode in their tragic history” (Abrahams 1894/1895, 458). This perspective, reflected in the meager attention mainstream English medievalists have paid to Anglo-Jewish history (Stacey 1987b, 63) is plausible, but wide of the mark. Jews played a role that was far more important than their tiny number might suggest in shaping England’s economy, social geography, and fiscal capacity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and their standing evoked recurring interest and concern that also was disproportionate. Further, if, as we will see, their growing insecurity, culminating in eviction, was critically affected by the establishment of rights and the creation of political representation at the national level in the early stage of the globe’s first proto-liberal regime, the Jewish expulsion seven centuries ago hardly is a minor event. The challenge of explaining the links between these institutions and the expulsion lend this history an ever more urgent quality in light of the unfortunate resonance that ethnic cleansing has come to have in our time, despite the great differences separating the circumstances of mass democratization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from the political and social state of affairs that prevailed some seven centuries ago.

The compulsory Jewish departure is not well understood. There are two primary puzzles. The first is strategic. Set within a framework of royal ambition, how did kings assess the advantages and risks of protecting or expelling the Jews? The second is temporal. When, and why, did the Jewish condition shift so that extrusion could become an option? What brought Edward to prefer a nation without Jews?

Edward I resolved to expel his kingdom’s Jews in the early summer of 1290 when parliament was in session. His expulsion order was promulgated on July 18. The exodus began on October 12 and was completed, as the king had ordered, by the end of the month. Disturbed only by minor violence, the Jews set out from England’s southern ports for
Echoing William Stubbs, England's great nineteenth-century constitutional historian, a leading scholar of the expulsion recently has urged students of the expulsion to focus on the king's dispositions, arguing that their exit "was Edward's own decision... Thus the final decision for expulsion seems to lie essentially with the king" (Mundill 1998, 253, 268). In the constitutional sense, it was, as Stubbs put the point, "an act done by himself." Because they were the king's Jews, their fate, of course, was overwhelmingly in the hands of the monarch. Other than belonging to the crown, they had no particular status (Richardson 1960, 134).

Yet a person-centered, solipsistic reading of royal preferences generally, or of Edward's in particular, with regard to the Jews is unlikely to be satisfying should it ignore either the timing and setting of the expulsion order, or, equally important, if it were to beg the question of how the larger circumstances in which kings governed affected their dramatic choices to uphold, modify, or overturn the practice of sovereign protection for the Jews.

The chance to consider these issues can help us think about this book's central analytical themes. Edward's break with precedent, reversing the insistence by prior kings that even Jews who wished to exit should be prohibited from leaving, provides an opportunity to consider the formation and transformation of preferences, the individually held "reasons for behavior... that account for the actions [taken] in given situations." Treated here, more specifically, as "the manner in which individuals construe situations (or, more narrowly, the way they frame a decision)." I probe how political institutions, mediating between individual agency and large-scale change, can elicit preferences that, in turn, reshape the larger environment (Bowles 2004, 99).

In the Balance

Edward's decision often has been thought to contradict royal interests. "How was it," a late nineteenth century historian of the expulsion inquired,

that, at a time when trade and the need for capital were growing, the Jews, who were reputed to be among the great capitalists of Europe, were expelled from England? How did Edward, a king who was in debt from the moment he began his reign till the end, bring himself to give up the revenue that his father and grandfather had derived from the Jews? How could he, as an honourable king, drive out subjects who were protected by a Charter that one of his predecessors had granted, and another had solemnly confirmed? (Abrahams 1894/1895, 75)

Over the course of their residence, as England developed a robust economy and emerged as Europe's most capable and effective administrative and fiscal state, Jews did prove a considerable asset. As sources of capital, they helped propel the growth of markets, towns, and networks of trade. As sources of revenue for the king and state, they helped fund ventures that enhanced English power and institutions. By the late twelfth century, their taxes were important enough to be collected and recorded separately. Under the ordinances of 1194, an exchequer of the Jews was created, a registry cataloging all Jewish holdings, centralizing financial control over their transactions, and making Jewish resources more amenable to effective taxation (Cramer 1941; Elman 1952). These regulations were detailed, specifying towns where contracts with Jews could be drawn and registered, and stipulating the supervision of record-keeping by Jews and Christians, including how keys should be held for the chests in which they were to be stored (Leonard 1891, 156–59; Poole 1951, 422–23). That year, "the Jews of all England," as a remarkable surviving record details, offered gifts of nearly 4,000 pounds, listed both by their town of residence and by individual names when the king returned from Germany (Leonard 1891, 162–64). Later, on a far larger scale, the Jews provided vastly disproportionate funds when John fought to keep the country's holdings in Normandy and Henry III struggled unsuccessfully to restore them. Jews, moreover, offered kings outposts of dependent populations and valuable sources of information located at the center of major towns, serving, in effect, as early warning indicators of opposition or insurgency.

Notwithstanding the advantages the presence of the Jews could offer, Edward's decision is, in fact, explicable in terms of royal interests. They were expelled despite these instrumental contributions. The Jews were a noticeable and widely disliked minority: for their religious stubbornness, perceived clannishness, self-enclosure, disassociation from the various institutions of a largely landed social order, and economic activity. If Jews offered benefits to the crown, they also identified kings with a pariah population, making them potentially less legitimate and more vulnerable to the claims, authority, and demands of vital interlocutors, including church leaders, rural notables, and urban elites.

Kings thus had to construe the situation and frame strategic calculations about the Jews by appraising how the primarily economic advantages they offered competed with the threat their presence posed to the quest for effective and legitimate rule. If the basic terms of this choice remained constant, weighing up the balance produced quite different results over time. The key challenge is therefore that of understanding why, when, and how one hierarchy of calculations was supplanted by
another. Ultimately, why did Edward favor Christian homogeneity at the cost of a financial asset?

To account for these results, this essay offers the following propositions:

After the loss of Normandy at the start of the thirteenth century, English kings responded to a configuration of geopolitical, economic, associational, and religious pressures that had decreased the security, autonomy, and legitimacy of the monarchy by consenting, with great reluctance, to remake the national regime’s institutional topography.

Singly and in combination, these efforts to reduce royal insecurity, which included the West’s inauguration of liberal rights and the practice of regular political representation in parliaments, weakened the commitment kings had to save their Jews from harm. Jewish well-being as a value diminished within the hierarchy of royal preferences.

As a consequence of growing societal pressures and a diminution of assured protection by kings, the Jewish condition declined over the course of the thirteenth century. Royal safeguards and a far more decent pattern of coexistence with Christian neighbors than existed in most places of Jewish settlement on the Continent, especially during periods of crusading, gave way to heightened physical, fiscal, and religious vulnerabilities.

In due course, a more radical change from moderated protection and a raised level of jeopardy to the possibility of exclusion was induced by the institutional arrangements of rights and representation to which kings had assented. Two tightly linked mechanisms were at work. The first was that these new “liberal” institutions moved the relationship of state and society from layered fealty to one of negotiated transactions, a process that powerfully altered the manner in which monarchs viewed the kingdom’s Jewish communities. The second was that revenue for key royal projects, especially warfare, now could shift from taxes fixed by custom to supplement income generated by royal landholding to taxes, mainly on moveable property, based on negotiation and consent, a shift that diminished the relative standing of Jews as contributors to the fiscal health of the crown.

Within the strategic logic of this new polity, the shift in royal preferences regarding the presence of the Jews is best understood as a constitutive part of Edward’s successful efforts at state-making and nation-building. As he learned to negotiate inside the terms and bounds of the parliamentary kingship to achieve the monarchy’s most cherished preferences for sovereign control over territory and people while guarding its standing and legitimacy and securing ample funds for key projects, he came to consider the situation of the Jews, and the range of options for dealing with their circumstances, in a new way.

Prospectively, Jewish deportation was not wholly determined by the country’s new institutional environment. There is strong evidence that as late as mid-June 1290 Edward was planning to obtain a new fiscal exaction from the Jews, as he sought to find means to reduce his court’s unsupportable level of debt (Stacey 1997, 89–90). What transpired in Westminster in the month before Edward’s directive was a negotiation between the king and an enlarged parliament that demonstrates the power of the mechanisms of transaction and taxation to construe a basic change in preference.

Over the course of the thirteenth century, kings responded to the tests posed by geopolitics, town growth, civil society, and national identity unevenly, with varying degrees of competence and success. By the time Edward finally expelled the Jews, it already was clear that he had managed the new form of kingship to successfully build an adept state, unify an English nation, extend the country’s power and territorial reach, raise the necessary resources, and win consent for public action. His success and the tragedy of English Jewry thus were entwined, as in a braid. The historian David Carpenter puts the point, if a bit limpidly, this way (2003, 466):

His achievement lay in establishing a new tax-based parliamentary state, and making the monarch for the first time since 1066 at one rather than at odds with the Englishness of its people. Edward by these means gained the power to wage his wars against the Welsh and the Scots. There also were certain internal victims of his rule. The Jews were expelled from England in 1290.

It is the tightness of this connection that has not fully been explored to date. Most students of the expulsion tend to account for the decision to eject the Jews by focusing either on their decline as a fiscal asset (Elman 1937; Veitch 1986), as if this capacity might not have been resuscitated, or point to shifts within the religious sphere (Langmuir 1990, 57–
133), as if they could not have been resisted, as so many papal and church pressures were, by the crown (Stacey 1999). Rather, the condition of the Jews was fundamentally conditioned by a change in the probability space for the development of royal preferences, a space that was affected most fundamentally by the trials the regime faced and royal responses to those challenges. Alterations and adjustments to the institutional situation of kingship, in short, not fiscal or religious factors as such, produced the sea change in royal preferences about the Jews that led to their excision.

Although this kind of focus on regime change is not the usual way the ejection of the Jews is explained—that pride of place, we will see, belongs either to fiscal causes or religious motivations and enthusiasms—it does appear as a key theme in small number of evocative articles. Writing in 1891, George Hare Leonard offered evidence that “parliament dearly wished to be rid of these aliens,” stressing how the connection of Jews “with the Crown could not fail to be very objectionable to the constitutionalists of the day,” and showing how “the politicians of the day pressed the constitutional grievance” (Leonard 1891, 103, 111, 129). Some nine decades later, Barnett Ovrut lamented that historians, rather than taking up Leonard’s theme, had “neglected to place the expulsion within its proper perspective: a conscious act of an aggressive and far-sighted government made in response to a number of political and constitutional factors which were playing an important role in the development of the English state” (Ovrut 1977, 224). His own rather general sketch contended “that the king’s decision to expel the Jews should have come when it did primarily due to political-constitutional factors,” but, unlike Leonard, he thought these to be issues “in which the Jews were only indirectly related,” notably pressures on baronial landholding, the result of debts to Jewish moneylenders, that produced demands for parliamentary redress (Ovrut 1977, 229). More recently, the most important historian of medieval English Jewry, Robert Stacey, has written an indispensable account of the “evolving political bargain” that was negotiated between Edward and the representatives who had assembled at Westminster in the summer of 1290, arguing that the expulsion of the Jews “was conceded specifically to the shire knights in Parliament, in turn for their consent to a tax for which Edward had already been negotiating with his magnates for some weeks” (Stacey 1997, 78).

In returning to the largely neglected line of reasoning pioneered by Leonard, this discussion falls between Ovrut’s suggestive but rather vague plea that more attention should be directed to constitutional and political issues and Stacey’s valuable pointillist treatment of Edward’s give and take with the magnates, burgeses, and knights in the period immediately preceding publication of the king’s order to expel the Jews.

What follows, then, is a political sketch that divides the history of the two centuries of Jewish settlement into three epochs. First was a long era, initiated by the Norman Conquest, of successful state-building based on property redistribution, town growth, and the growing capacity of public authority in a system of centralized feudalism. Second was a half-century spanning the baronial revolt of the 1210s through mid-century to the start of a new epoch of civil war, dominated by the decisive loss of territory in France, the creation of a political society that possessed irrevocable rights, and the governing autonomy of towns. Third was a tumultuous critical juncture of three decades in which a monarch was deposed, only to be returned on the basis of a new regime placing the king in parliament at the core of government and its ability to raise revenue in a process of negotiation with the representatives of an expanded political nation that included magnates, knights, and burgesses; and in which an English cultural and linguistic nation began to be constructed with ambitions to command all of the British Isles and participate actively in European crusading as a distinctively English force.

At each of these moments, the fate of the Jews utterly depended on the country’s kings. Their preferences were constituted in the main by the ways they could deal with royal insecurity and by the play of the new institutions they unwillingly had conceded to keep the monarchy intact. Whereas the first long moment proved virtuous for the Jews because kings construed situations and framed decisions about this group as a buffer and helpmate for the combination of feudalism and state-making in which they were engaged, subsequent developments radically altered the parameters characterizing their regimes. In consequence, kings developed preferences about the Jews that led first to a steady relaxation of royal defenses against elite and mass pressures on Jewish life, and ultimately to circumstances in which expulsion could be considered and accomplished.

Thirteenth-century revisions in governance produced a far-reaching doctrinal, administrative, and institutional reframing for the position of the king as a ruler and head of state. In turn, these fundamental alterations entailed a thoroughgoing shift to the way John, Henry III, and Edward came to take decisions about the Jews. More precisely, the institutions they created to deal with royal insecurity at home changed the way they ordered their preferences. Jews, who never were liked in medieval England, persistently faced pressures that sought, by religious accusation, economic and social boycott, symbolic degradation, and violence to constrict their settlement and reduce the scope for their remunerative activity. Kings were regularly challenged to lift their protective umbrella. Until the second decade of the thirteenth century, they resisted these pressures, placing their responsibility to shield the Jews ahead of consid-
erations that might have made the group more vulnerable. This ordering of royal preferences changed, however, during the last eight decades of Jewish settlement, in a manner that significantly devalued the guardianship role of kings. By late century, this shift had moved expulsion as a policy from a location outside the ken of feasibility into a space where it became an increasingly probable outcome.

Royal Sufferance

At the time of the Norman Conquest, the country did not have a Jewish community. No Jews had been on the island since the days of Roman rule. They began to arrive in small numbers from Normandy, primarily Rouen, after suffering in 1096 at the hands of Crusaders preparing to leave for the Holy Land (Gold 1998). The refugees first settled in London, their sole place of residence for some four decades. After 1140, with the blessing of the country’s kings, Jews came to live in trade and market center towns all across England, where they tended to cluster in Jewries, though there were no spatial ghettos that confined or walled them in. Not Christian, not part of feudal relations or a wider network of social relations, and not free to pursue most occupations, they were confined mainly to moneylending, a visible and theologically odious economic niche (Helmholz 1986). Providing capital to small as well as large landowners, religious establishments, urban merchants, and to the crown itself produced widespread indebtedness to Jews, often affecting such institutional arrangements as feudal landholding as a result of how debts were discharged (Stacey 1985).

From the start, Jews existed on royal sufferance. Formally, they were the property of the crown, thus exposed both to routine taxation and targeted special expropriations. “The Jews were under the special protection of the king who in turn could tallage them at will” (Poole 1951, 422). As vulnerable residents, they were protected by royal decisions authorizing their rights to residency, property, and travel. They required special protection because they were external to the basic seigniorial and communal mechanisms of English feudalism (Bartlett 2000, 351). From Henry I forward, they were sheltered by Charters based on earlier models established by Carolingian Emperors of the ninth century and the Holy Roman Emperors of the twelfth. Henry’s Magna Carta Judaicorum stipulated that “Jews have free residence in England and Normandy, and may hold lands, fiefs, pledges, gifts, and purchases” (Leonard 1891, 331). Like these precursors, this type of arrangement shielded Jews, at least formally, from others who wished them ill, while defining them vis-à-vis the king, the broader polity, the economy, and society as residents rather than as subjects. The king was responsible for defending the Jews, whom he recognized and forced others to acknowledge as a distinct entity free to organize as a largely self-governing religious community. Under this arrangement, local sheriffs, as delegates of the king played a particularly important role, as “their support was essential to local Jewish communities when danger threatened” (Hyams 1974, 275).

The initial twelve decades of Jewish settlement, though punctuated by a small number of allegations of anti-Christian ritual killing and extensive popular assaults in 1189 and 1190, were a time of relative prosperity and coexistence. William II, Henry I, Stephen, Henry II, Richard I, and John sheltered a steadily extending Jewish community, a population these kings considered a valuable resource as they sought to develop their recognizably modern ambitions. Like their successors, they were jealous and determined about frontiers, dominions, and powers. They sought to reinforce their internal rule by external success, and make external success possible by strengthening internal rule. They acted to establish a combination of independence from potentially powerful actors, whether religious or secular, and achieve durable supremacy over territory and population. Although there had been earlier efforts to consolidate royal authority and integrate the kingdom, including exertions to secure its place under Danish rule in Anglo-Saxon England from the early eleventh century, struggles to hold the island’s polity together rarely had been successful for long. By contrast, through a series of audacious acts, most notably land redistribution, the Norman monarchs fashioned a remarkable system of feudalism, combining a high degree of layered local autonomy with clear fealty and obligations to the center, the focal point of which was of course the king. By contrast with various continental models, English feudalism was characterized by an uncommonly clear hierarchy of loyalties buttressed by coherent public administration, policing capacity, and, above all, by the wholesale reallocation of property. All feudalisms are parcelized, but this decentralization was quite exceptionally counterbalanced by royal centralization. It was this system, combining property, authority, and loyalty that did more than protect the Jews: it gave them a role as engines of urban and market expansion integral to this system of centralized feudalism (Reynolds 1999; Waugh 1999; West 1999). It also set in motion a series of dynamic developments—including an emergent civil society and potential political nation both on the land and in towns, debt at significant interest that would come to be seen as onerous, and popular resentment at examples of Jewish prosperity and visibility at the center of English towns—that, under changing conditions, later would haunt both the kings and the Jews.

The new Norman rulers, who deployed an itinerant style and served both as king of the English and duke of the Normans, sought to secure
and where possible expand the territory under their dynastic control on their various English and French frontiers to take in more resources of all kinds, including a larger subject population. Seeking to stabilize governance and reduce uncertainty, these kings sought to create durable and effective institutions of rule by establishing networks of loyal officials and instituting a net of communication linking the enlarged territories under their control. During the second half of the eleventh century, the Norman kings brought their new kingdom under control by integrating its administration with that of Normandy, often moving key individuals from roles on one side of the Channel to the other (Le Patourel 1976, 222–78), and by marshaling a potential armed force of some six thousand knights to garrison the many new castles they built (Dyer 2002, 86). Most important, “Englishmen were expropriated by the hundreds and thousands” (Reynolds 1994, 343), and their lands were assigned to Norman landowners, thus creating a ruling class linked across the lines of property and political power (Thomas 2003, 105–37).

This radical act, “the largest transfer of property ever seen in English history” in which “a whole upper class was displaced” (Dyer 2002, 80) fashioned a new aristocracy and a new social hierarchy (Dyer 2002, 85):

In place of the pre-Conquest hierarchy of wealth consisting of a few super-magnates towering over many modestly well-off thegns, the new social order established about 200 substantial tenants-in-chief, earls and barons holding directly of the crown, who together owned about half of the land. Below them were another 1,000 landholders with land worth at least 5 pounds, and 6,000–7,000 lesser men, some resembling pre-Conquest thegns, many with only a hide.

Having distributed immense estates in wholesale fashion to their followers in the form of royal grants, the new large landholders, in turn, were free to distribute parcels to their own followers (Reynolds 1994, 345). It was this hierarchical arrangement that was recorded so meticulously in the Domesday Book, the astonishing census of grants and landholding that William I ordered to be compiled in 1086. Overall, the land did not belong to the king, but landholders owed their place in the chain of property to the crown, thus creating a powerful tool of social and spatial integration for a monarchy based primarily in London.

This was a period in which landowning conferred many more duties than rights, including that of military service. Norman rearrangements in property went hand in hand with a military system combining the obligation “on all free men in the kingdom to serve and defend” the king “against his enemies both within and without England” with a reliance on household troops, paid soldiers, and knights who particularly owed military service as a result of their economic and social status. This dual system produced effective means to extend, protect, and police territory and its population, the hallmark of modern sovereignty. It also was a powerful fiscal instrument. Scutage, or payment for failure to serve in a particular military campaign, though often disputed, became a reliable source of income, one that complemented the period’s other major source of taxation, the danegeld, a customary tax on property that was assessed on royally granted lands, counties, and towns, and collected by the justices of the kings who traveled throughout the kingdom for this purpose. There were downward pressures as these funds were raised, for magnates would impose fees on their knights to help them pay the levy as well as discharge the debt they owed to Jews (Reynolds 1994, 352, 361–65; also see Green 1986).

None of the state-building ambitions of the eleventh and twelfth century post-Conquest English kings could have been pursued effectively without the existence—new to this period—of a sphere of the economy situated mainly in towns, based on money and trade rather than land and barter to which kings could achieve privileged access (Elias 1939/1994; Pirenne 1937; Abrams 1978; Hohenberg and Lees 1985; Bairoch 1988; Benevolo 1993). By realizing an ability to effectively tax the surplus of this dynamic sector, kings could secure their advantage over other actors with whom they potentially competed for political control. With access to a money economy as a source of revenue, kings gained means to equip and deploy military force, build administrative capacity, and police the behavior of others. In this manner, as Michael Mann has observed (1988, 86), early urban capitalism combined with systematic taxation and special exactions made it possible to build and integrate state structures. On the Continent, some cities and states became competitors (Tilly 1990; Tilly 1994; Spruyt 1994), but in England they developed a powerful synergism.

Understanding this opportunity, the Normans encouraged the growth of towns as loci of security, dynamic economic sites, and ecclesiastical centers where the church could be constrained. Towns emerged, often under the grant of royal charters, as distinct collectivities with rights of association and other personal freedoms, access to self-governing apprenticeships and crafts, mercantile possibilities, and the prospect of self-government for their burgesses. Integral to feudalism (arguably, without towns feudalism could not have thrived), towns also fashioned a distinctive free space, where Jews could reside and to whose economic roles and prosperity they could contribute.

Living in these settings, Jews were not just direct financial assets to kings, but important indirect sources of revenue to the extent that their
moneylending and bullion-dealing contributed to the robust economic development of the twelfth century. Their provision of widely accessible credit to the country’s wealthiest institutions, including landowners, urban commercial interests, and the church, made sources of economic lubrication available that otherwise either would have been absent or more difficult to obtain. These funds also enlarged sources of revenue for the crown. Kings thus had strong incentives to safeguard the Jews in circumstances in which the loyalty of the country’s rural and urban elites to the crown, in the main, remained continuous (key exceptions concerned disputes over dynastic succession), where state-building was taking place, population and prosperity were advancing, a money economy and town development progressed, and lands were held in reasonably secure fashion by a cross-Channel dominant class in the context of an Anglo-Norman kingdom that was well integrated into larger European dynastic and religious establishments. The Jews may not have been liked but, from a royal perspective, the gains of their presence rather dramatically outweighed any price to be paid.

Until 1189, there were very few episodes of local anti-Jewish mobilization. Even though no intrinsic value was placed on group diversity apart from its pragmatic implications, and even as the emergence of ritual murder accusations in Norwich (1144), Gloucester (1168), Bury St. Edmunds (1181), Winchester (1182), and Bristol (1185) and the renewal of crusading placed Jews on a plateau of apprehension, their condition was sheltered effectively by the crown.

After Henry II’s death in 1189, England was swept by popular anti-Jewish violence. In September, thirty members of the London Jewish community were killed during the coronation of Richard I. Soon, with the king out of the country (he spent only six months of his ten-year rule in England; otherwise, he either governed in France or served as a leading participant in the Third Crusade), brutal assaults on the Jews spread to Lynn (later Kings Lynn), where the whole community was killed, and, in sequence, to Norwich, Bury St. Edmund, where fifty-seven Jews were murdered on Palm Sunday and the survivors were expelled, Stamford, where all the Jews who failed to reach the castle were killed, Lincoln, Colchester, Thetford, Ospringe, Winchester, Dunstable, and, most famously, York, where nearly all the town’s Jews died by self-immolation in Clifford’s Castle. In all, this wave of violence resulted in some 500 Jewish deaths, or between 20 and 25 percent of the group’s population at the time (Dobson 1974). There appears to have been something of a common pattern, in which the events were “instigated by . . . a number of the nobles who were heavily indebted to the Jews, or were pressed by the Royal Treasury which had taken up the debts to deceased Jews” (Jacobs 1893, 381, 389–90).

These depredations had violated articulated law, repeated in the following terms in 1180s:

It should be known that all Jews, wheresoever in the realm they be, ought to be under the protection of the king’s liege. Nor ought any of them place himself under any rich man without the king’s licence; because the Jews themselves and all theirs belong to the king. And if any detain them or their money, let the king, if he will and can, ask it back as if it were his own. (cited in Leonard 1891, 68)

Where the king’s representatives were able to move quickly, as at Lincoln, violence against the Jews was stemmed, and, as a contemporary, William of Newbury, observed, “the rising quickly subsided.” By contrast, he wrote, “the men of York, were restrained neither by fear of the hot-tempered King nor the vigour of the laws, nor by feelings of humanity, from satiating their fury with the total ruin of their perfidious fellow-citizens and from rooting out the whole race in their city” (Leonard 1891, 117).

After the coronation violence, Richard quickly reasserted his custodial responsibilities. Ringleaders of the 1189 London riots were arrested. Three were hung. In a proclamation conveyed by letter to sheriffs in each English county to affirm the protected status of the Jews in March 1190, the king confirmed, in the words of this new Charter, “all their customs and liberties just as the Lord King Henry, our father, granted and by his charter confirmed to the Jews of England and Normandy, namely to reside in our land freely and honorably . . . and we command and order you to ward and defend and protect them” (Leonard 1891, 134, 136). In 1190, Jews took refuge in the royal castles of Norwich and Stamford. They were protected by royal officers in Lincoln, and provided with an armed royal escort when they left Bury St. Edmunds. The king, who was in France during the events in York, responded by sending the Bishop of Ely to take action. “The deeds done at York,” William recorded that year, “were soon carried across the sea to the prince, who had guaranteed peace and security to the Jews in his kingdom after the rising at London. He is indisputable and in a rage, both for the insult to his royal majesty and for the great loss to the treasury, for to the treasury belonged whatever the Jews, who are known to be the royal usurers, seem to possess in the way of goods” (Leonard 1891, 132–33). Eighty magnates and burgheurs were arraigned, severe fines imposed, and estates confiscated. Jews soon returned to York. Within three decades, the town again housed one of the England’s most significant and prosperous Jewish communities.
Four years after the ascension of John in 1201, a new Charter of Liberties was issued, echoing the language in prior charters of the Jews: "Know that we have granted to all the Jews of England and Normandy to have freely and honourably residence in our land, and to hold all that from us which they held from King Henry, our father's grandfather, and all that now they reasonably hold in land and fees and mortgages and goods, and that they have all their liberties and customs just as they had them in the time of the aforesaid King Henry, our father's grandfather, better and more quietly and more honourably" (Leonard 1891, 212). This document reaffirmed that Jews could freely travel within England, possess property, sign contracts, maintain inheritance rights, and be free from tolls and customs duties. The charter also regulated legal dealings across the Christian-Jewish boundary, stipulating that Jews need only appear in royal courts, nonroyal cases against Jews were to be judged by Jews, plaintiffs of either religion required witnesses from both, and Jews could clear charges against them when they lacked witnesses by taking an oath on the Torah.

With the renewal of royal protection by Richard and John, Jews once again came to live in a climate of reasonable coexistence, marred, until the mid-1210s, only by an 1192 ritual murder accusation in Winchester. Fateful, this era of peace was shattered by the targeting of London's Jews during the Barontal Revolt against King John in 1215, an episode famous for culminating in Magna Carta. Until that moment, with the temporary, if awful, exception of 1189 and 1190, a royal umbrella had assured Jewish safety despite the Christian population's only grudging forbearance. Certainly, they had lived with a significantly higher degree of safety than their continental brethren. Ephraim b. Jacob, a Jew in Bonn at the time, observed in his documentation of the persecution of Jews in France, Germany, and Spain during the crusading of 1146 to 1148, that during the reign of Stephen "in England the King of Heaven saved the Jews through the King of England. He turned his heart so that he protected them and saved their lives and property" (Leonard 1891, 239).

Transformations

The increasingly unsettled relationships linking the English crown to the country's elites in the thirteenth century brought the long period of relative Jewish security to a close. A series of quite remarkable developments—including external territorial contraction followed by internal expansion, the considerable extension of towns and an urban-propelled money economy, the growing self-consciousness and capacity of the class of rural barons, and the early, tentative, but tangible emergence of an English nation with which kings had to identify and negotiate—radically unsettled the prerogatives, security, and authority of the monarchy and literally forced kings to concede an extension of existing constraints on their prerogatives that already had emerged within common law. During the thirteenth century, rights were codified for members of an emerging and partially autonomous civil society, and representative institutions in early but recognizably modern parliaments made the central state permeable to societal preferences. In turn, these broadly liberal entitlements and arrangements generated key preferences that thirteenth century kings developed about issues of nation and state, as well as their preferences about the country's Jews.

Over the course of the twelfth century, the post-Conquest landed class together with a growing free town population came to constitute the main sources of royal revenue and support. Later, however, as English kings faced the constellation of dramatic and intersecting challenges of the thirteenth century, these two social groups fashioned the nucleus of a civil society that challenged the standing and autonomy of the crown (Newman 1988). As a result, a monarchy that had stood on the shoulders of their support no longer could count on it. Precisely the features that had led to the integration of the dominant social classes and had produced far more social cohesion and integration than existed in France or the German lands now facilitated the growth of an antimonarchical society, one based on a sense of shared fate and loss, effective communications networks based on family ties, common experiences, a kingdom with relatively fine roads, and many emergent town centers.

The first engine of change was geopolitical. The key episode was the loss of the English dynasty's French lands in the first two decades of the thirteenth century. At the decisive battle of Bouvines in 1214, the exclusion of English holdings in Brittany, Anjou, Maine, Touraine, and especially in Normandy—in all, territory about three-fourths of that of England itself—was confirmed (Powicke 1913). Over the course of the next four and a half decades, efforts to regain these areas failed. Finally, in the Treaty of Paris, agreed in 1258 and ratified the next year, Henry III recognized this defeat to be permanent. This dramatic territorial diminution replaced both the Anglo-Norman state and an Anglo-Norman nobility with an English focus and an English landed class. "England was now assuredly the centre of the political firmament of the kings in England in a way which had not been true since the Norman Conquest" (Davies 2000, 20).

These dramatic changes generated powerful effects. They made the crown the target of disenchantment, as losses in France profoundly harmed landowners who had been as essentially French as English. They, and others, especially town burgesses, who had helped fund the unsuccessful military ventures across the Channel, resented the high cost
of their fiscal burdens that had produced such a resounding defeat. In trying to win resources to regain lost lands, John had successfully experimented with new types of taxation (Holt 1992, 43), and increased his tax revenues, which more and more were directed at individuals, to fund a dramatic growth in spending, which ran at the remarkable rate of 25 percent each year between 1207 and 1212 (Carpenter 2003, 271). Some of John’s heaviest demands were mounted before his last unsuccessful attempt at Bouvines to recover the kingdom’s French lands, and they were enforced by the use of extreme measures where necessary (Holt 1992, 191). Further, when he turned to the Jews for significant sums, he also put new pressure on those in debt to them. In these circumstances, both the rural and urban social forces that long had been bulwarks of support for the monarchy rather rapidly became available for mobilizations that made claims and favored privileges against the crown and its prerogatives. One target of this mobilization, we soon will see, was the king’s Jews.

The intensity of discontent associated with the loss of Normandy brought John face to face with the prospect that his denuded regime might be overthrown. During the last half-decade of his reign, that is from 1212 to 1216, John faced the century’s first potent insurgency by a coherent civil society in the countryside and in the towns, That violent baronial revolt was not just directed against the person of the king, but against the monarchy and its prerogatives. There had been revolts before, like that of 1170 to 1174 against Henry II, but these typically had been fought as battles about dynastic rights within the royal house. By contrast, the failed effort by barons to murder John in 1212 and the countrywide revolt after Bouvines sought to force a change to the basic terms of the regime itself.

John dealt with this powerful insurgency and the striking increase in royal insecurity it engendered by conceding unprecedented rights to his subjects; as Chapter 63 of Magna Carta put it, “that the men in our realm shall have and hold all the aforesaid liberties, rights and concessions well and peacefully, freely and quietly, fully and completely” (Holt 1992, 473). The rights he granted at Runnymede in 1215, a charter of liberties based on an explicit contract between the king and his subjects that conceded permanent constraints on what not just he, but all future kings legitimately could do, drew on ideas that had been developing within the baronial and knightly classes in the prior generation. Though the document was precipitated by the failings of John’s government, especially abroad, Magna Carta was more than a negative appraisal of his rule, but “a criticism of a system of government” marked by unfettered royal discretion (Holt 1955, 2). As a potential political nation developed in the upper reaches of rural and urban society, its members came to resent, then resist, heavy fiscal exactions, the terms and often repressive enforcement of loyalty, and they came to think that the king’s oaths to govern according to law were insufficient in circumstances where the king possessed extensive but not very well-defined powers and the boundary between law and will was inexact. Further, with the growing enhancement of the administrative tools at the monarch’s command, a language of tyranny accusing the crown of behavior that contravened both law and custom was becoming more common.

Magna Carta codified limits to these powers, and thus clarified what the king could not do. Royal orders would no longer depend simply on the king’s will. Chapter 1 proclaimed that “the English church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.” Chapters 38 to 40 established that trials must be supported by credible witnesses, that justice cannot be delayed, and that, most famously, “no free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or dispossessed or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him except by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” Overall, the charter focused on the details of royal transactions with society, especially terms of inheritance, debt, and taxation, including the regulation of scutage, weights and measures, and obligations to military service, and included prohibitions on confiscations of timber, corn, horses, carts, and other goods, and freedom of movement for merchants within England and in leaving and entering the kingdom, other than in times of war. It further promised to restore liberties and rights from which subjects had been deprived. All this, it directly averred, had been granted “for the reform of our realm and the better settling the quarrel which has arisen between us and our barons” (Holt 1992, 449–73).

A striking feature of this constitutive document is the prominent place of Jews in the provisions concerning debt. The relevant clauses, the tenth and eleventh, modified these obligations:

If anyone who has borrowed from the Jews any sum, great or small, dies before the debt is repaid, it shall not carry interest as long as the heir is under age, of whomsoever he holds; and if the debt falls into our hands, we will not take anything except the principal sum in the bond.

And if a man dies owing a debt to the Jews, his wife may have her dower and pay nothing of that debt; and if he leaves children under age, their needs shall be met in a manner in keeping with the holding of the deceased; and the debt shall be paid out of the residue, saving the service due to the lords. Debts owing to others than Jews shall be dealt with like wise.
In seeking to enhance the crown’s revenues, John had made it a practice to take the debts owed to the Jews after the death of a creditor. J. C. Holt’s classic study of Magna Carta observes that, “since 1210 especially these had become a major source of income to the king and one of the main instruments of financial persecution of the aristocracy” (Holt 1992, 211). In August 1212, just two days after discovering the main plot on his life, John relaxed these debts as his first concession. The articles of Magna Carta thus extended this undertaking, modifying, and easing the burdens caused by this source of finance. Strikingly, once John’s reign ended, these chapters were omitted from the texts reissued in 1216 and 1217 as part of a larger effort to cleanse the document of the clauses that had most offended the royalists (Jordan 2003, 34); under pressure, they were confirmed anew by Henry III in 1236.

The Jews were urban dwellers. During the thirteenth century, the towns they inhabited grew, as the urban nodes of the English economy came to be ever more important with the expansion of the country’s commercial sector and the network of markets and fairs in towns, the rise of trade, and the acceleration of manufacturing. As new towns were founded and older ones expanded, the country came to be covered by a network of linked urban places. Almost all contained Jews, whose provision of credit was an integral feature of these settings.

After Magna Carta, Christian citizens of towns gained more rights to jurisdictional autonomy, town defense, and self-government. Towns were the country’s first zones of societal liberty. Freedom was “the essence of town law.” This included liberal provisions for the sale and inheritance of property, exemptions from tolls, but it “was also personal: town air could make a villein free” (Bartlett 2000, 337). Although responsible to the crown, towns developed robust forms of urban government, including financial autonomy, distinct laws, town officials, representative bodies of aldermen, and a sense of proud local identity. They also were loci of a variety of collective organizations, including guilds and mutual aid societies. Towns were the first organized venues for the formation of a recognizably modern public opinion and institutions of collective choice (Bartlett 2000, 337–42).

With their growing role in the economy and social structure of England, kings increasingly had to manage their relationships with towns carefully and negotiate their exchanges with local leaders and officials, especially because the towns were sources of unrest and collective mobilization. Sometimes, kings responded with repressive acts via police powers enforced by sheriffs, but more often, over time, they learned to accommodate to urban power. Beginning in the early 1230s, towns used this capacity to expel their Jews. From the perspective of these urban centers, Jews represented a constitutional anomaly. Towns had no direct control over them despite their pattern of residence, economic importance, and high visibility. Further, it was in towns that resentment of usury and religious objections to Jewish practices concentrated (Leonard 1891, 134).

In the course of trying to arrive at an equilibrium in his relationship with the towns, Henry III relaxed the crown’s control over local affairs. Especially where urban opponents of royal absolutism were strongest, they were given scope to expel their Jews. The baron Simon de Montfort, an opponent of royal absolutism who later led the century’s most important insurgency, oversaw the expulsion of Leicester’s Jews in 1231. Soon, other towns took the same course of action. In the decade spanning 1234 to 1244, these included Newcastle, Warwick, High Wycombe, Southampton, Berkhamsted, Newbury, and Speenhamland. There also was a revival of religiously motivated accusations in this climate of reduced royal oversight: burning a Deacon who had converted to Judaism and married a Jewess, in Oxford in 1222; charging a Jew with forcibly circumcising the son of a convert, in Norwich in 1234; (he was tried by a church trial with no Jews eligible for the jury); an allegation that the body of a dead child had been cut to write Hebrew, in London in 1244 (he was buried near the high altar at St. Paul’s); accusations of ritual murder in Norwich in 1251, and Lincoln in 1255 (the famous case of Little St. Hugh of Lincoln that later made its way into the *Canterbury Tales* [Langmuir 1990, 237–62]). With royal protection in the towns diminished in favor of local policing, there also were episodes of violence and the confiscation of synagogues in London in 1239, 1240, and 1243, and in Oxford in 1244. In this context, a royal order of January 1253 refused permission to Jews to extend their settlement to towns where no current community existed, and explicitly stipulated that no Jew could stay in England unless the person’s presence was of direct benefit to the crown (Richardson 1960, 59).

The increasing autonomy and ability of towns and their governments, a site and source of societal liberty, thus proved hazardous to the Jews in circumstances where the king had been forced to widen the scope of rights for his subjects. More broadly, the growth of rights was replete with danger for rights-less Jews, when John and especially Henry relaxed their guard as they pursued “the better settling of the quarrel” with the society they governed. Negotiated rights for Christians went hand in hand with a change in how kings framed their decisions about Jews that led to a retraction of royal protection. Though still in place, the terms of the various charters that were meant to define and secure Jewish freedoms and status became increasingly hollow.

It was in this context that church leaders came to have more capacity to regulate Jewish life, and to act on their growing doctrinal suspiciousness about Jews. These developments took place in an environment that
featured increasingly unfriendly religious preaching. Throughout the period of Jewish residence, the church tended to oscillate between two views: one that welcomed the physical presence of Jews as a confirmation of the truth in light of their place in Christianity’s grand narrative, and another that regarded Jews who refused to convert as stubborn primitives who should pay a price for refusing this truth. Over the course of the thirteenth century, the second position gained ground, and was reflected increasingly in onerous provisions (Langmuir 1990). The Council of the Province of Canterbury that met in Oxford in 1222 limited Jewish employment in churches, placed restraints on the construction of synagogues, cut off social intercourse with Jews identified as usurers, and reinforced the requirement, initiated by the Bull issued by Innocent III at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, that Jews wear a distinguishing badge. In 1240, Jewish books and all known copies of the Talmud in England were seized and burned by papal decree. That year, a church synod at Worcester, and others at Chichester in 1246 and Salisbury in 1256 renewed anti-Jewish regulations. In 1251, Jews were ordered not to eat meat during Lent. In a reversal of earlier practices, the king now personally sanctioned local outrages against Jews. In 1255, after the ritual murder accusation that followed the discovery of a boy in a cesspool during a Jewish wedding, the case of Little St. Hugh, Henry traveled to Lincoln to order that the accused be hung.

The post–Magna Carta situation of transactions between the king and his subjects also tilted the fiscal burden in a Jewish direction. When Henry fought difficult battles in Wales, undertook losing ventures in France that failed to reconquer lost territory, and developed enhanced itinerant ceremonial features of kingship throughout England, the only group with considerable wealth without recourse to peaceful or violent resistance was the Jews. Rather than heighten the risk of further revolt, it made sense for the crown to ratchet up Jewish charges. In the 1230s, Jews were taxed at three times the rate of the 1220s. Between 1227 and 1259, they faced tallages of some 170,000 pounds, plus other levies, including an exacting in 1244 of 40,000 pounds on the pretext of ritual crimes. A high tax on the Jews was levied in 1245 to rebuild Westminster Abbey. In 1250, the king compensated for reducing the tax burden on his restless barons by accelerating Jewish assessments. By some estimates, the king confiscated fully half the total wealth of the Jewish community in the 1240s and 1250s (Carpenter 2003, 349). In turn, these exactations put enormous financial pressure on individuals who owed money to Jews, since, ultimately, they had to finance these obligations. Five years later, the fiscal noose tightened further as two Jewish financiers were appointed to oversee the community’s economic matters as if they were in bankruptcy.

The Ninth Crusade, launched in 1271 by Edward on the eve of his kingship, was funded primarily by tallages on the Jews. Having been taxed so heavily in prior decades, however, they were unable to meet their full assessment. Falling short by one-third, their share was compensated by Edward’s uncle, Richard of Cornwall, to whom the Jews were assigned as security for one year. This levy was quickly followed by two additional tallages, marked by repressive enforcement: a final charge by Henry III in 1272 and a first, confiscatory exaction of just under 170,000 pounds by Edward, as he returned to the Crusade that had been interrupted by his father’s death. With their moveable assets wiped out, many Jews found they could not pay a vastly smaller tallage in 1275. Some were imprisoned, and their wives and children deported. In 1287, the Jewish community could only pay one-third of the 12,000 pounds Edward demanded.

These growing religious and fiscal pressures underpin the most familiar explanations for Edward’s decision to expel the Jews. One line of reasoning stresses the radical transformation to the ambitions and worldview of the Church with the advent of crusading and its fervent culture. It also takes into account the rise of fundamentalist mendicant orders, the stimulation of local religious enthusiasms, an increasingly rigorous and consistent hostility by religious leaders to usury, and umbrage at the central and visible urban location of this self-consiously different and alien group. A second, even more dominant, view highlights how the fiscal capacity of the Jews diminished over the course of the thirteenth century, so that they no longer constituted a resource worth defending. At times, these historiographical strands combine, as in Paul Hyam’s conclusion that “Edward’s own actions were guided . . . by his sincere religious bigotry, but his constant concern for royal interests would never have permitted him in this self-indulgence had not the royal revenue from Jewish sources dropped far below the halcyon days before the Barons’ Wars,” and now “was near to exhaustion” (Hyam 1974, 288).

Certainly it is not possible to apprehend the normative and strategic circumstances of kings without coming to terms with the profoundly Christian character of their realms or the growing institutional and doctrinal antagonism of the Church. But kings and their actions cannot be trimmed down to religious compulsions and motivations. Monarchs often maintained their policy of protection in the face of episcopal pressures on occasions when bishops lent their authority to mass anti-Jewish feelings. Henry III, for example, ordered his sheriffs to put a halt to economic boycotts of Jewish communities that had been mandated by the Church (Hyam 1974, 288). In any event, at no time did the English Church call for Jewish expulsion. Nor did monarchs ever simply respond to anti-Jewish mass and elite pressures which were present in one or
another form throughout the period of Jewish residence. Moreover, there is little evidence that the generalized opprobrium Jews faced when Edward decided on expulsion was dramatically greater than the ill-favor that had prevailed over the course of this history, especially during such periods of high stress as the widespread wave of assaults on Jews in 1190. Then, we have seen, Richard I protected his Jews and further regularized their relationship to the monarchy. A century later, there was no direct mass or religious pressure on Edward to expel his Jews.

In all, though this line of reasoning about religious pressure illuminates the milieu within which royal decisions were made, it was not the primary source of the choices made by English and French kings to expel the Jews. Leonard thus was right to observe in 1891 that “the religious feeling of the day evidently influenced the King as it influenced his people, but in neither case can it be considered paramount” (Leonard 1891, 129). The key issue is not the character or intensity of pressure from below, but why royal protection receded over the course of the thirteenth century. That question has to drive us back to the political realm.

Because kings had overstretched their Jewish resource with increasingly punitive exactions, a spiral of economic collapse had set in. “It is therefore clear,” Peter Elman concluded, “that the Jews were expelled because from an economic point of view they were no longer performing that function which was their sole raison d’être in the circumstances.” Likewise, John Veitch claimed that “by 1290 the Jews were no longer an important source” of finance, “allowing Edward I to appropriate their property at little cost” (Elman 1937, 252; Veitch 1986, 33).

Yet without being nestled inside a larger consideration of state and regime, the fiscal account, like the religious, cannot bear the causal weight put on it. Recent research rethinks whether the economic situation of England’s Jews, while diminished, had become quite as dire or irremediable as this line of analysis argues. For sure, the Jewish community had come under a great deal of fiscal pressure as a result of confiscatory tallages and legislation in 1275 banning their participation in moneylending. Nevertheless, the combination of a growing role for Jews in the expanding wool trade, shifts to other forms of urban commerce, and a tolerated, if semi-clandestine, continuation of loan-making created circumstances that had begun to reconstitute Jewish wealth sufficiently to renew their potential as a source of revenue for the crown. That ability might have been nurtured further (Mundill 1998, chaps. 4 and 5). In France, Jews had suffered a worse financial fate, yet recovered. During the reign of Louis IX, they had been subjected to extraordinary taxation in 1223, 1227, and 1230 to pay for the king’s crusading, faced restrictions on usury, and, especially harmful, experienced the steady withdrawal of support by public authorities for the recovery of their loans. Despite this concerted assault on its economic circumstances, the Jewish community survived, and began to flourish once again when Philip IV eased restrictions on Jewish credit and allowed a renewal of the group’s main economic activities. On this example, the financial exhaustion of England’s Jews might have proved ephemeral. Edward’s preparation for a new Jewish tallage in June 1290 lends credence to this possibility. So too does clear evidence that in 1285 and 1286 he had actively considered a major reform that would have legitimated while closely regulating Jewish moneylending as an alternative to the formal ban that had been enacted in 1275 as a means to placate restive debtors, especially the knights, while restoring the Jewish community as a successful economic asset for the crown (Stacey 1997, 99).

Further, the fiscal line of investigation begs a key question. Why did kings permit, even facilitate, a deterioration in the economic circumstances of the Jewish community? Which stresses narrowed royal time-horizons so that kings substituted assertive searches for revenue in the short-run regardless of longer-term consequences? Which pressures changed the larger matrix of political calculations within which kings made decisions that altered the fiscal situation of the Jews? The fiscal argument, in short, also becomes persuasive only if placed within a larger set of political considerations.

New Maps

Magna Carta did not so much settle key issues about the character of the monarchical regime as fuel a struggle to define the terms of the new relationship between state and society. As the historian William Jordan comments, “Henry III’s reign was lived in the scholarly shadow of Magna Carta. Any move he made that provoked opposition raised the spectre of an appeal against him to the principles of Magna Carta” (2003, 236). These tensions became more acute as decades of effort to restore English possessions across the Channel came to naught.

Henry’s quest to roll back French gains by seeking and paying for expensive alliances with opposition movements in France, and, his aggressive stance of expansion within Britain were terribly expensive. Further, the price of buying support grew as he built a kind of theater state (Powicke 1950; Colvin 1971; Geertz 1980) marked by visible spectacle to enhance royal legitimacy. These features of his reign placed enormous fiscal pressure on all those in England who had the capacity to fund the state, including the Jews. Together, these developments demanded more and more royal revenue, yet also more and more caution by kings as they sought funds from landed and urban feudal elites.

From Bouvines to the formal acceptance of this new reality, in 1259,
in the Treaty of Paris, a distinct, if still early and sketchy English identity began to take shape. Although the French language was not replaced by English in government or in the courts until the fourteenth century (Parliament started to hold its sessions exclusively in English only in 1362), the recrudescence of an English identity that had been crushed by the Norman Conquest was now initiated (Kohn 1940, 69). For this, the loss of Normandy proved pivotal. Whereas the twelfth-century baronial elite had been Anglo-Norman, with the loss of their lands in France, as David Carpenter has noted, it “would be born, brought up and based exclusively in England. So would the king. Families might still retain memories of their Norman ancestry, but the logic of embracing an entirely English identity was now overwhelming.” As a result of his setback in Normandy, John “was the first king to drop altogether the ‘French and English’ form of address in his documents. His subjects were now all English” (Carpenter 2003, 8). The English language revived in moving up the ladder of the social structure to take in the gentry and nobility, so that by the middle of the thirteenth century “there seems little doubt that even the highest aristocracy could speak English. Henry III’s brother, Richard, Earl of Cornwall, certainly did so. So indeed did Edward I.” Earlier, English had been the language of most ordinary residents. Now its fluent use rose up the hierarchy. French gave ground, and, like Latin, increasingly became a language that had to be taught. By mid-century, this process was well advanced. Living almost entirely in England, Henry “was far more English than any king since 1066” (Carpenter 2003, 353).

Nonetheless, in the face of a growing English national sentiment, he was widely viewed as an alien king, in part because of his dynastic ties on the continent, a charge that condensed and helped organize diverse currents of discontent against what, increasingly, was an unpopular reign—for its geopolitical failures, expensive tastes and high taxes, high-handed administration, abuses by his sheriffs, and limited access to the court and its decision making (Carpenter 2003, 350–54). Before Edward seized the mantle of Englishness, however, his father was still widely viewed as French. As a result, tensions between the king and society, which often took the form of disputes about the meaning and enforcement of Magna Carta, sometimes took on the character of a national conflict against alien rule.

Simultaneously, the royal map of power became more English. Under Henry III, dramatic shifts advanced the standing of England on its side of the Channel, within the British Isles. Under Henry III, “an effective modus vivendi . . . [developed] in the relationship between the English kingdom and the rest of the British Isles under non-English rule,” as the “native rulers of Ireland and Wales had adjusted their ambitions to the practical reach of their power” (Davies 2000, 21–22). Ireland was now ruled by the English king stylized as lord of Ireland (a title Henry III passed to his son in 1254), and “most of the country was now, directly or indirectly, under English rule; parts of it were densely settled by third- and fourth-generation English colonists; and the essential features of English law, institutions, land tenure, economic practices, ecclesiastical habits, and culture had been transplanted to the island” (Davies 2000, 76). Wales was increasingly integrated as a dependent territory (though not fully conquered until the 1280s), neither to be separated from the English crown nor eligible to be a separate country. To the north, the growth of a distinct political identity in Scotland made it easier for English kings to assert their sovereignty on their northern borders; at the same time, the English aristocracy extended its family networks and property holdings into Scotland. In all, English hegemony over the British Isles advanced considerably during Henry III’s reign, a development that reinforced tensions about the costs of empire and the definition of Englishness.

Concurrently, town growth continued apace, creating stronger bonds among its residents as local government continued to develop. Towns had their own officials and courts, raised revenues, administered services, and possessed legal identities. As self-governing entities with rights formalized in charters with the crown, and with growth in the number and scope of guilds, urban associational life was enriched, thus providing further sources of potential mobilization in opposition to the crown. Political liberties, including elections and representative assemblies, first were practiced in the towns, where they became durable institutions, as well as for demands insisting that equivalent institutions be created at the national level. For the oligarchy of merchants and landowners who dominated the towns, free spatial, social, and political patterns became important resources when insurgent impulses against the king turned, as they did in the late 1250s and 1260s, into a full-blown rebellion, then civil war.

With the early development of a tangible if limited national identity, the extension of the country’s rule in the British Isles following a half-century of episodic warfare in France, and the development of towns, Henry faced a more potent opposition than John had some four decades earlier. The breach between politically active subjects and the monarchy widened.

Ever since the 1240s, proto-parliamentary councils gathered by the king from time to time had demanded more authority over taxation and royal appointments. A 1244 paper constitution making such claims served as the basis for a successful, if short-lived, constitutional revolution in 1258. Under physical pressure when the Earl of Norfolk led a
group of magnates dressed in full armor to confront Henry at the West-
minster, the king "thought he was a prisoner. Instead, he was made to
accept a general reform of the realm" (Carpenter 2003, 360). These rules
stipulated that the governmental decisions would now be made by a
committee of twenty-four, half chosen by the barons. Further, at the par-
liaments that met in Oxford in 1258 and 1259, the work of reform in-
cluded stipulations that sheriffs, the king's key agents, henceforth
would be chosen from the community of local knights and serve for a limited
term, and that parliaments would assemble at least once a year.

These Provisions of Oxford—a series of memoranda concerning re-
form—constituted a revolutionary transformation (Maddicott 1994, 159–
63). Under their terms, the king lost control of royal castles to the barons,
and the hands of government passed to a council of fifteen (appointed
by the twenty-four), that included Simon de Montfort, his leading oppo-
nent, with the capacity to select ministers and superintend the adminis-
tration of the realm, and with the charge to govern collaboratively with
parliament "to deal with the common business of the realm and the king
together" (Carpenter 2003, 369).

The king soon reneged on his acceptance of this new political order.
The provisions, he argued, had been enacted by barons in their narrow,
not public, interest. By 1261, the provisions had been overturned and
Montfort had retreated to France, but the king's revival of his customary
powers proved temporary. Montfort returned in 1263 as the leader of a
self-designated English rebellion to which the king surrendered, commit-
ting the crown to expel foreigners and appoint only the native born to
office. The provisions were reenacted, placing the king once again under
the control of a council and parliament.

Edward led the counterattack on behalf of his father and the preroga-
tives of the crown. Divided into armed camps, the kingdom was torn by
civil war when Montfort and his followers rejected a ruling, favoring
Henry, made by France's Louis IX, who had been called on to arbitrate.
In May 1264, Henry and Edward were taken prisoner on the Sussex
Downs. The provisions were restored and the council was reimposed on
the monarchy by parliament in June. Now, Montfort effectively ruled in
the king's name while Henry was held in London without real power.
One of his most important decisions enlarged the political class to in-
clude knights, who joined the June parliament, and town burgesses, who
were made eligible to send representatives to parliament for the first
time in 1265.

The revolutionary government lasted until August. Magnates siding
with Henry led a counterattacking military coalition that killed Montfort
at Evesham. Restored, Henry was not prepared to govern under the
terms imposed at Oxford. But he also understood that he could not sim-
ply restore the status quo. To secure enough of a social consensus to
govern and renew stability, he endorsed and coopted the demand for
regular parliaments that were based on election, representation, and con-
sent (albeit by a very small slice of the population). In so doing, he
achieved something of the balance that John Brewer described for the
English state of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a first ex-
ample of a state strengthened by the paradox of parliamentary constraint
on the monarch as a result of a liberal institutional shift that "lent greater
legitimacy to government action" (Brewer 1988, xix).

This turbulent transition to a parliamentary kingship placed En-
gland's Jews in considerable hazard. Wherever the rule of the king was
supplanted or significantly curtailed, attacks on the Jews usually fol-
lowed quite quickly. Without royal protection, especially in the context
of a politicization of Jewish debt by insurgents, truly ugly events ensued.
The Jewish quarter of Canterbury was burned in 1261. London's Jewry
was sacked in 1262. In a great massacre, hundreds were killed there two
years later. Deadly rioting also was directed against the Jews in 1264,
during Montfort's ascendancy, in Canterbury, once again, and in Wor-
cester, Bristol, Bedford, Winchester, Lincoln, and Nottingham. It was,
Jordan remarks, "a particularly bloody civil war for English Jews, whom
some of the dissident barons and their supporters saw as royal flunks,
insofar as the profits of their money-lending, exacted from their baronial
debtors among others, were often appropriated by the Crown" (Jordan
2003, 238). Relief from subjugation produced oppression in another form.

One feature of these assaults was the confiscation by rebels of the
archae, the chests where records of indebtedness to Jews were stored by
delegates of the Exchequer of the Jews. These seizures stood in a lineage
of claims demanding the alleviation of debts owed to the Jews. Such
reform, promised by the Oxford Provisions, became a centerpiece of
Montfort's program over the course of his rebellion, when it provided a
key inducement for support by lesser as well as greater landowners.
In the eight months between October 1264 and June 1265, Montfort's
government pardoned the debts and interest owed to Jews by sixty of
his followers. "The number and novelty of these writs," his biographer
remarks, "suggests that there was a policy here. Its object was to gain
popularity for Montfort's government, at no cost to himself, but at the
expense of the Jews and of the king who was lord of the Jews" (Maddi-
cott 1994, 316). Whenever the king was pressed hard, as in Magna Carta,
one of his first concessions was to release debtors from obligations to
repay Jewish loans or soften their terms.

It soon was clear that by bringing society into dialogue with the king
in parliament about the situation of the Jews, their lives would alter for
the worse. An early harbinger was the bargain struck by Henry as his
son, Edward, prepared a crusade between 1268 and 1270. Henry “negotiated with parliament after parliament, summoning to them knights and on at least one occasion burgesses as well. In the end, he secured a tax, after imposing restrictions on the Jews,” legislating the Provisions of Jewy that curtailed their rights to hold land (Carpenter 2003, 382).

Expulsion

In a general summary, the historian Bernard Guenée observed that European “medieval monarchy was limited by theory but not controlled by institutions” (1985, 86). The last years of Henry’s kingship and the reign of Edward, by contrast, marked the first period when English kings indeed were controlled, or at least strongly constrained and influenced, by an institution—parliament. The much-revised constitution made the prior framework, within which kings made choices about the Jews—how much they should be taxed, whether to endorse or permit local expulsions, the degree to which royal protection should be proffered, how to deal with demands about Jews by notables or the Church—obsolete. The new politics that regular political representation convened made the country’s Jews radically more vulnerable by reshaping the manner in which Edward framed his decisions about resources and political legitimacy.

The main precursor to parliament were the aristocratic councils, sometimes joined by church leaders, that Henry III had convened in the 1240s to secure funding for his military ventures that customary income could not sustain. Exchanges there typically took the form of proposals for levies offered by members of the king’s retinue, with counter-suggestions by barons who usually demanded fidelity to Magna Carta as the price of their backing. Primarily forums for speech (parler), however, these bodies only loosely could be called parliaments in the sense of a modern legislature (Jordan 2003, 237).

The central institutional result of the Montfortian revolt was the establishment of parliament as an assembly with the capacity to legislate on matters of taxation and warfare. By regularizing political representation for subjects in civil society, and by conceding bargaining power over the fiscal capacity of the monarchy, Henry and especially Edward crafted parliamentary kingship, a model that strengthened ties between state and society on the basis of regular exchanges between kings and an increasingly settled core of representatives that included magnates, burgesses, and knights. Although far short of an organizationally developed legislature, late thirteenth-century parliaments included such innovations as a process for petitions, committees, a growing judicial role, supervision and oversight of royal administration, and a prominent place for the king’s ministers in parliament (Richardson and Sayles 1931; Bissone 1969, 354).

Parliaments became the key site for negotiations between a plural set of authorities, and thus utterly altered the conditions of government. During his first full thirty-five years as king, the first in which parliaments were present throughout, Edward summoned parliament forty-six times, almost always attending in person (Field 2002, 49). Parliaments had become “the means of vesting the king’s government with consent, of mobilizing general support behind it, and of neutralizing discontents aroused by its policies” (Miller 1970, 6).

England’s regime now was based on negotiation. A critical example was the issue settled by the Quo Warranto, a statute parliament passed early in the 1290 parliament that sat when the Jews were expelled. Ever since he had ascended to the throne, Edward had pushed to return rights, including the right to collect revenues, to the king that once had been passed to notables, or had been taken by them, when royal claims could not be documented in writing. Many notables resisted, claiming that these rights had been passed to them by oral agreement. The statute conceded that the king’s entitlement to recover could go back no further than the start of the reign of Richard I, in 1189. This compromise was emblematic of the new order. Popular discontent and royal legitimacy now were mediated by parliamentary conciliation undertaken within a legislative process.

By far the most important set of policy innovations these new arrangements produced was the growth of noncustomary national taxation (Harriss 1975, 40ff; Levi 1988). Edward had expensive habits, not least his efforts to extend English hegemony. He pacified Wales between 1277 and 1284 by persistent warfare and the construction of a network of massive castles, and annexed the territory in 1284's Statute of Wales that parliament approved (Mann 1986, 424–30). It was within parliament that he had to obtain the resources necessary for this and other state-building ventures. Parliamentary taxation was not his only source of revenue—monies were raised from the church, from customary duties, and from income from royal lands—but it increasingly funded the state. What was novel was that these funds were the outcomes of explicit agreements based on negotiation. The political nation had to consent to be charged.

Edward emerged as one of the great lawmakers in English history. Stubbs’s Constitutional History celebrates him as a king whose parliamentary statutes became “the basis of all subsequent legislation, anticipating and almost superseding constructive legislation for two centuries.” Likewise, the twentieth century constitutional historian T. F. T. Plunkett argued that “a thorough commentary upon the statutes of Edward I would be in effect a history of the common law from the thirteenth century
down to the close of the eighteenth” (Stubbs 1870, 171; Plucknett 1949, 156; cited in Hogue 1966, 216).

As it turned out, this new form of government strengthened the king and state by advancing royal legitimacy and increasing the sources of revenue that made it possible for the administrative and military features of the state to grow. One indicator of this étatist modernization was the separation of the household from the chancery in the early years of Edward’s parliamentary kingship, with the chancery becoming a key institution promoting the capacity of the executive state with the consent of the governed, who approved the key policies it carried out for the king.

“In administration, finance and justice these years tell the same story,” a historian of parliament from the start of Edward’s reign has summarized. It is one “of a dramatic increase in the scope of government which impinged on the interests of a substantially wider sector of the community but at the same time provided facilities for subjects to assert and defend their rights.” In this way, “parliament came to fulfill its unique function as both an instrument of royal government and the voice of the community” (Harriss 1981, 35), albeit soon to be a community without Jews.

Edward’s period in office also was marked by a deepening trend of internal empire. He settled a new map for Britain by bringing the fragmentation and continuing turbulence marked by earlier episodes of war to an end. Guarded by his new forts on the periphery, Edward emplaced English settlers in the outer parts of Britain, and practiced symbolic as well as violent intimidation, notably in his extended victory march through Wales in 1284.

These adjustments to political life created a radically new environment within which royal preferences were shaped. Edward’s inclinations and policies toward the country’s Jews were primarily induced by these altered institutional dynamics. Actively pursuing the internal imperial project, he was the first king to establish “a new tax-based parliamentary state” that negotiated resources and terms of rule with civil society, and he was the first since 1066 to make the monarchy “at one rather than at odds with the Englishness of the people” (Carpenter 2003, 466).

In securing English rule over more of the British Isles, Edward made the Jews seem even more foreign. By the time they were expelled, Edward could justify the renewal of war against France with the claim that “the French wished to destroy the English tongue.” Here, Carpenter notes, “the English language was being used as synonymous with the English people in a way that would have been impossible even a hundred years before” (Carpenter 2003, 8–9). With the extension of use for the English language, the growth of an English national identity developed in contradistinction not only to the French, or to the Welsh, Scots, and Irish, but to the Jews. Their everyday French speech, use of French in conducting transactions with the wider society, and conduct of internal religious and communal affairs in Hebrew, made them seem ever more strange both to their immediate neighbors and to those officials who increasingly identified with, indeed were part of, the push toward Englishness that the Jews could not join. The prodigious religious barrier that already separated Jews from the great majority now was entwined with national and linguistic elements. As English identity intensified and became politicized, Jews ever more were on the outside (Thomas 2003, 307–22).

Within a country governed by negotiation, royal protection flagged. Little was done to prevent the pillaging of London’s main synagogue in 1272, or the anti-Jewish riots in Southampton and Bristol in 1274 and 1275. Indeed, local expulsions now carried a form of royal sanction. The Queen Mother’s dower towns of Marlborough, Gloucester, Cambridge, and Worcester expelled their Jews in 1275. With the erosion of royal safeguards, Jews also were more exposed to Church provisions that aimed to further segregate them, as in the Statute of Pillory of 1267 that forbade Christians from buying meat from Jewish butchers.

But why were the Jews expelled? Even within this menacing environment in which the conditions of Jewish life had weakened and the degree of security the crown offered England’s Jews had diminished, they continued, in the main, to lead peaceful and resilient lives. Had Edward chosen to enhance their physical and economic security, they might well have continued to be of assistance to his various royal projects. Despite a history of local expulsions in England and France, no national model for the wholesale removal of Jews yet existed.

The expulsion of 1290, in short, was not inevitable. But its likelihood had vastly increased with the shift in institutional arrangements and in state-society relationships since Montfort’s rebellion. The growth of a new political society, the rise of parliament, the augmentation of Englishness, and the pressing need for revenue together altered the way in which the king came to frame the Jewish question. This shift radically altered the period’s matrix of possibilities, opening the way for expulsion to become a real option.

Robert Stacey’s reconstruction of the summer of 1290, when “the largest single grant of taxation conceded by parliaments to any medieval English king” was enacted, helps us see how the shift to a parliamentary kingship radically changed Edward’s preferences about the presence of Jews as a permanent population. This was a pivotal parliament, not just for the Jews. It was here that the fiscal basis of the state decisively shifted to taxes on moveables, with the amount increased to a level that might close a persistent gap between revenues and expenditures (Willard 1913).
Jewish expulsion became part of this basic change in ways that "could not have been foreseen," even when the specific negotiations of that summer began (Stacey 1997, 78).

During that parliament, the type of bargain that had been evolving between the king and his society with regard to rights, representation, and resources advanced dramatically. The part of the king's negotiated understanding with parliament completed first was the Quo Warranto, followed by Quia Emptores, a law adopted during the second week of July that protected the rights of wardship and custody of lords when their tenants wished to sell their lands. These two pieces of legislation were negotiated with a parliament dominated by magnates, and did not directly involve any bargaining about the fate of the Jews. The knights, the period's House of Commons, then were summoned to join parliament from July 15, to make it possible for the king to enact his new type and level of taxation with their participation and agreement. The session's earlier concessions had "sealed the king's bargain with his lords; and in return for it," Stacey observes, "the magnates were prepared to recommend to the Commons that they grant the king his tax" (Stacey 1997, 92).

The knights who arrived in mid-July quickly and successfully exacted Jewish expulsion as their price. For the prior two decades, England's knights, as lesser landholders most susceptible to the costs of forfeiture, had been demanding legislative relief from the burdens imposed by Jewish debt. After his return following Montfort's death, Henry III restored the Jewish loans that had been revoked during the revolt. Numerous such debts had passed to the king after so many Jews had been killed by the rebels. In turn, Henry assigned many of these obligations to loyal followers and members of his family, who, by enforcing repayment, could acquire the lands of those without means to repay (Stacey 1997, 93–96).

The larger magnates had two forms of protection: influence at court and alternative forms of credit. As a social class, the knights thus were most vulnerable, so it is not surprising that they regularly pressed their complaints about Jewish moneylending on the parliamentary agenda. When parliament gathered between June 1268 and August 1270, the knights persistently raised the issue, and were not prepared to concede the taxes requested by the king until legislation was drafted by Henry to manage Jewish moneylending and annul fee-rents that subsequently would fall into Jewish hands. In 1271, again at the demand of the knights, Jews were prohibited from owning land.

Edward's massive tallage on the Jews in 1274 placed enormous downwards pressures on the knights. At a parliament gathered in October of the next year, the knights agreed to a new tax but only in exchange for a formal ban on Jewish moneylending. Yet the effect of the statute was mainly to drive much of this lending underground, so that pressures on the knights continued. By 1290, they demanded nothing less than the eviction of the Jews. Framed as part of a larger resolution to a parliamentary negotiation, Edward assented and the Jews soon had to leave. On 18 July ... expulsion orders were issued to the sheriffs, and in return the Commons representatives gave their consent to a fifteenth on the movable property of the kingdom. By Friday 21 July the bargaining was done, and the king left Westminster for a six-month journey to the north" (Stacey 1997, 92). Stacey persuasively concludes that from 1268, legislation against Jews and Jewish lending was the essential precondition upon which local society in England was prepared to vote voluntary taxation to the monarchy; and because the king concluded in 1290 no lesser measure would secure the consent he needed. Edward got his tax, and in return the Commons got the expulsion; and it was on these terms that the tax was justified to the countryside. By and large the country considered it a fair bargain. There is noticeably less complaint about the pressure of taxation in 1290 than there had been, for example, about the significantly lighter taxation of 1275. (101)

The development of Parliament as a site of negotiation did not alter the fundamental state-building preferences of the king, which remained quite consistent. But this institutional transformation did reshape royal preferences with regard to Jews in tandem with the political exigencies of the moment, most notably the goal of establishing a stable and productive modus vivendi with the barons, knights, and urban burgesses that could secure for the king a reliable and modern tax base. Once established, at the expense of the Jews, the arrangement negotiated by Edward that was geared to these goals endured despite enormous changes to England's political economy in the following centuries.

As a result, every monarch before the English Revolution sustained Edward's decision to exclude Jews from the kingdom. The manner in which the situation of the Jews was reframed within the ambit of England's new regime proved durable, almost certainly because it would have been impossible for his successors to have governed with the consent they needed if they had tried to reverse his course. When, as in 1310, Jews petitioned for a return, they were rebuffed. A Jewish homecoming had to wait until Cromwell's forces badly needed fresh resources if they were to have a chance to endure.

So this is an unsettling history, one that raises thorny questions about how the doctrines and institutions of the Western liberal tradition—the
globe's strongest guardian of cultural, religious, ethnic, and racial pluralism—could have actively accommodated and advanced religious bigotry and minority group punishment. Taking a long view, we would do well to acknowledge the difficulties as well as the promise.

Notes

1. From the sixteenth century, there was a small, discreet Marrano community of practicing Jews who had converted to Catholicism before their expulsion from Spain in 1492 (Katz 1994, 1–14).

2. Of course, the relevant attributes that comprise preferences include a broader range, and may include values, beliefs, habits, emotions and psychological propensities, norms, commitments, and tastes. For a useful discussion, see Bowles (2004, chap. 3).

3. Jews are also recorded to have been corn traders, fishmongers, cheesemongers, goldsmiths, physicians, and pawnbrokers. A few others were scholars, as chronicled by Roth (1949).

4. In their nature, ritual murder accusations were directed against named individuals, not the group. For a striking account of the form such accusations took, in a book that focuses on a slightly later period and on the continent, see Rubin (1999).

5. William of Newbury has left a contemporaneous account of the anti-Jewish violence of 1190, including the murder of the Jews at Lynn, that records the connection between monetary motives and religious piety: “Bold and greedy men thought that they were doing an act pleasing to God, while they robbed or destroyed rebels against Christ and carried out the work of their own cupiditas with savage joy and without any, or only the slightest, scruple of conscience. . . . The first outbreak against them occurred, as we have heard, at Lynn, a city renowned for its thriving commerce, where many of this people dwell, overbearing by their numbers, the greatness of their wealth, and the protection of the King. . . . Their houses were stormed and pillaged by the Christians, and burnt by the avenging flames and many of them fell victims to the fire or sword of the enemy” (Leonard 1891, 113–15).

6. We mostly remember this Council gathering in Oxford for the origins of academic regalia worn at commencements and other university ceremonies. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the new universities were established with tight ties to the Church. Clerics, or aspiring clerics, mainly taught ecclesiastical and theological subjects in institutions that obtained papal charters. Academic caps, gowns, and hoods familiar to us grew out of the clerical dress of the period. In 1222, Stephen Langton, England’s leading medieval archbishop, decreed that clergy should wear a closed, flowing gown. Both Oxford and Cambridge fell within the province of Canterbury; thus clerks in these institutions met the terms of this decree. Later, the dress of the clergy changed, and the capra clausa became exclusively academic.

7. A tallage “was an intermittent tax paid either in money or in kind by the direct feudal subjects of rulers and was spent at the discretion of the ruler” (Green 1997, 240).

8. From the evidence at hand, it is not possible to know precisely whether Edward responded to the knights or offered the arrangement in anticipation of their well-known wishes.

References


