its equilibrium and duration become; it tore at the nerves of those who followed it.

My heart began to accelerate, becoming more important than the music, shaking the bars of my rib cage, compressing my lungs so the air could no longer enter them. Gripped by panic at the idea of dying there in the middle of spasms, stomping feet, and the crowd howling, I ran into the street like someone possessed.

Morrison remembers smiling when reading this passage, in part because Cardinal’s recollection of the music had such immediacy and “partly because of what leaped into my mind: what on earth was Louie playing that night? What was there in his music that drove this sensitive young girl hyperventilating into the street,” feeling “like someone possessed”? Morrison muses upon the “way black people ignore critical moments of discovery or change or emphasis in literature not written by them” and the “consequences of jazz—its visceral, emotional, and intellectual impact on the listener,” which in this case tipped Cardinal from sanity to madness, from rationality to irrationality.²

Just as distinctions between rationality and irrationality can play a role in the ranking of people, they can also play a role in the ranking of nation-states. Hugh Gusterson has shown that in literature on economic development, First World countries are depicted as mature, reliable, stable, trustworthy, law-abiding, rational, and logical (in other words, acting like adult men) while Third World countries are depicted as immature, unreliable, volatile, untrustworthy, lawless, irrational, and emotional (in other words, acting like childish women).³ As for nation-states, so for the disciplines: Avery Gordon lays the groundwork for understanding how in the contemporary social sciences, the producers of rigorous, logical, robust, hard, scientific knowledge about the real world (economists or quantitative sociologists) often attempt to consign to the outer darkness—I use the term advisedly—imposters (cultural anthropologists or sociologists) who pretend to produce knowledge about social worlds while merely telling loose, emotional, delicate, or soft stories.⁴

Feminist efforts to understand how the dichotomies of gender and race are anchored, in order to loosen them, have taken a number of forms. Some, like Elizabeth Grosz, have turned to analysis and validation of the subordinated and excluded term, the body, which is “the unacknowledged condition of the dominant term, reason.”⁵ Others, like Gusterson or Gordon, argue that those associated with the dominant terms of the dichotomies seek to maintain their separation and distance from the subordinated terms precisely because they uncon-
sciously know and fear the existence of the subordinated qualities within themselves. For Gusterson, the First World "self" in effect contains all the womanly and childish characteristics it imputes, out of fear, to the Third World "other"; for Gordon, the stance that sociology can provide an "unproblematic window onto a more rather than less secure reality" is haunted by a "seething presence," "one form by which something lost, or barely visible, or seemingly not there to our supposedly well-trained eyes, makes itself known or apparent to us." The ghost haunting sociology is that “[t]he real itself and its ethnographic or sociological representations are also fictions, albeit powerful ones that we do not experience as fictional, but as true.”

Taking another tack, the one I will follow in this paper, feminist scholars in science studies have argued that the tidy boxes in which the hoary old dichotomies have appeared to be contained for hundreds of years are coming apart. There is increasing awareness, in part through ethnographic research in scientific and nonscientific contexts in which knowledge is produced, that science is less a pure realm of rational, logical knowledge than a porous field transected by many other cultural contexts and forces, which are partners in the production of knowledge. In realms like biomedicine and cyberspace, the walls holding apart the mind and the body, human and machine, rationality and irrationality, are being breached, allowing a whole host of hybrid, cyborg, partial, or amalgamated entities to emerge into the light of day. Creative new possibilities thus open on all sides, pointing the way toward different and perhaps less injurious distinctions. In tune with this flux, there is evidence that change, multiplicity, and flexibility are becoming part of normative conceptions about the nature of personhood in Euramerican cultures. Over the decades since the 1940s, cultural conceptions of the ideal self and body have been becoming less autonomous, isolated, and defended, and more permeable, vulnerable to the outside, and embedded inextricably in complex systems (and in turn within wider systems).

**RECUPERATING THE IRRATIONAL**

If something as fundamental to the Enlightenment conception of reason as the kind of subject who can know is undergoing dramatic change, the question arises whether this change might extend to recuperation of the irrational, primitive, unconscious, and illogical. Would permeable, vulnerable, and contextually embedded selves not have knowledge that would be figured as irrational or illogical by the canons of Enlightenment reason? Can such "irrational" knowledge gain social validity, and if so, how would it be refuged in the process?

I have been considering this question ethnographically, as part of a larger project that looks at shifts in the value attached to cognitive and emotional states involving lability that occur in both the sciences of the mind and popular culture. Until recently, states involving continuous cognitive or emotional shifting have been understood as illnesses, liabilities, habits of mind that get in the way of forming the kind of self—stable, steady, developing on a unilinear track—most valued in the citizens of modern nation-states. Recently, the value attached to one quintessential category of instability, mania, seems to be shifting, and its status as a liability is perhaps growing less stable. In the sketch below, I will look at ways mania is growing less substantial as a separate and stigmatized category and is instead being understood as a cultural construct, a category made in relation to its immediate context and liable to change and shift accordingly. I will also point out ways in which the category mania is simultaneously gaining concreteness, timelessness, and facticity by being attached to particular physical causes that lie behind and explain its presence. Finally, I will consider how the tension between these views ("mania" as a culturally constructed way of being in the world vs. mania as caused by a determinant physical source) bears on what I think may be a kind of "colonization" of certain manic states, which has to do, among other things, with the production of a labile self who seems best "fit" for the environment of late capitalist development.

**MANIA SHIFTS GROUND**

One way in which the category mania is shifting is that it is coming to be seen as part of a sliding scale of states: even in the official manual of the American Psychiatric Association, the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM IV)*, there are degrees of being bipolar, including a less severe form called bipolar 2—with hypomania, a less extreme form of mania. Recently another intermediate category has appeared, called "hyperthymia." Peter Kramer, author of *Listening to Prozac*, describes it in a recent *U.S. News and World Report* editorial: "Personality researchers have noted that 'hyperthymic' men—those with a constant upbeat mood, two steps short of mania—have high sexual appetites. Hyperthymia is a personality style thought to have strong biological roots, perhaps related to the biology of manic-depressive illness. Certainly a number of politicians are hyperthymic. They are
energetic, optimistic, and decisive, and they require little sleep.” Hyperthymia is a temperament, signaled by an individual’s typical emotional behavior over an extended period of time. Hyperthymics are the individuals who apply themselves successfully to business, the politicians, those who enjoy being with the crowd and who see themselves as people of action and the leaders of their communities. Thus, although the extreme moods of mania and melancholia may seem separate and apart from common experience, in fact the spectrum of human emotion is broad. “Mood states that have great benefit in some walks of life coexist with others that can do great harm.” Peter Whybrow thus suggests that there is an extraordinary and terrifying continuity between the normal self and the madness of manic-depression. This way of speaking of a range of normal and abnormal states as close cousins (a term Whybrow uses) echoes a technique used by the linguist Roman Jakobson, who analyzed the structure of many forms of aphasia. He saw all forms of aphasic alteration in speech, as well as child language, as fully part of language. The differences could be called differences of style. “In manipulating these two [particular] kinds of (linguistic) connection... [an aphasic] exhibits his personal style, his verbal predilections and preferences.” Jakobson considered that every aphasia is a style.

Another way the category mania is shifting is that mood disorders involving mania are not only becoming classified as continuous with the normal but undergoing a dramatic change in valence. Accounts of manic-depression have recently been flooding the press, the best-seller list, and the airwaves. Manic-depression has fueled the plot of a series of detective novels (A Child of Silence and others by Abigail Padgett), a prison escape novel and movie (Green River Rising, 1994), a southern novel (Sights Unseen, 1995), plots of the television program The X Files, and a memoir on the best-seller list for many weeks (An Unquiet Mind, 1995).

What is of compelling interest here is that manic-depression seems to be in the process of redefinition from being a disability to being a strength. These new claims, highly specific to the present social context, can hardly be taken at face value, especially by those who live with manic-depression, but this makes them no less interesting. The psychiatrist who is the author of the memoir I mentioned above, Kay Jamison, takes great pains to describe the positive aspects of manic-depression alongside the negative. Manic-depression entails a “finely wired, exquisitely alert nervous system.” These thought processes are characteristic of the manic phase: “fluency, rapidity, and flexibility of thought on the one hand, and the ability to combine ideas or categories of thought in order to form new and original connections on the other . . . rapid, fluid, and divergent thought.” In a number of books and Internet sites, there are lists of famous and influential people whose diaries, letters, and other writings indicate that their manic-depression played a role in the enormously creative contributions they made to society. Jamison lists over two hundred composers, artists, and writers who arguably had some version of manic-depression, from T. S. Eliot and Edna St. Vincent Millay, to Georgia O’Keeffe, Edvard Munch, and Jackson Pollock. An important question I can only allude to here is whether these developments trade on what Michael Bernstein calls a dangerous tendency toward celebrating excess, or trading on the appeal of the “self declared marginal and powerless.”

Manic-depression is said to entail a “distorted” sense of time and space: “delusions” abound in the manic phase. Objects seem to merge, to flow into each other. Shapes shift. Any ordinary thing can change into something else and then something else again. The process happens unbidden and is not necessarily sinister at all. It can be as interesting as watching things morph in a movie! Inside and outside the self are blurred. Thought is rapid and flighty, jumping from one thing to another.

As rapidly as they are described, however, these distortions become assets. In the present environment, in which time and space are in many ways stretching, condensing, speeding, warping, and looping linear time and space, these perceptual abilities can easily seem to be talents in accord with new realities instead of irrational delusions. In general, the qualities praised fit perfectly with the kind of person frequently described as highly desirable in corporate America: always adapting, scanning the environment, continuously changing in creative and innovative ways.

If there is an increasing demand for restless change and continuous development of the person at all times, in many realms, then manic-depression might readily come to be regarded as normal—even ideal—for the human condition under these historically specific circumstances.

I do not mean to imply that appreciation for manic-depressives is entirely new. In her book The Psychiatric Persuasion, Elizabeth Lunbeck has shown that in the early twentieth century psychiatrists generally reacted favorably to patients they diagnosed manic-depressive. As psychiatrists of the time told it: “the story of the manic-depressive was lively, often raucously so, and entertaining. Such individuals engaged the world around them head-on, often wreaking havoc at home and driving their relations mad . . . but they did so with a verve that drew
admiration. Their signal characteristics—loquacity, excitability, intense sociability, and mordant wit—differed from those of normal individuals only by virtue of their excess. 24 E. E. Southard, psychiatrist at the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, supposed that “every one of us is of manic-depressive stripe.” One difference I am seeing today is the extent to which the category of mania and of manic-depression has been widely taken up outside clinical settings, in many domains of popular culture. Another difference is the way manic-depression is associated with gender categories. In the early twentieth century, far more women were diagnosed with manic-depression than men, by some estimates twice as many. Lunbeck suggests that gender was encoded in the very category itself: “The most salient characteristics they saw in the manic patient were those associated in other contexts with an unbounded, out-of-control femininity that was at once frightening and alluring.” Men diagnosed with manic-depression appeared “much like women” to their doctors, relatives, and friends: “excitable, distractable, and talkative, his conduct governed less by rational considerations than by plays of fancy.” 26

In contrast, dementia praecox (later schizophrenia) was coded “male.” Its stolidity, stupidness, and catatonia “were merely the extreme, pathological manifestations of man’s naturally more stable nature, just as the periodicity that characterized the manic mimicked in a more marked form the natural periodicity of women.” 27 Today the gender differences for manic-depression have disappeared: “manic-depressive illness . . . is equally prevalent across gender,” while major depression, with its immobility and numbness, is more common among women, not men. 28 It would be dangerous to make too much of such statistics, and at this point in my research, I am only speculating, but I wonder if we are watching today the inception of the male manic, seen as potent and effective despite his instability and irrationality. Is it possible that the “female” energy and exaggerated spirit Le Bon so despised in crowds now appears to us as a resource we need to tap for survival? 29

One of the main features of mood disorders is that they are commonly medicated by drugs such as lithium or Depakote, often described as “managers” of manic-depression. 30 Interestingly, lithium is said to be resisted by patients more ferociously than any other drug psychiatrists prescribe. Widespread informal consensus labels lithium the drug that elicits by far more “failure to comply” than any other. As one patient told me, “I’d rather stand in front of a moving train than tell my psychiatrist I am manic, because I know she will make me take more lithium.” 31 People who are not manic-depressive cannot understand this resistance to lithium, which promises you can “be normal.” “But if you have had stars at your feet and the rings of planets through your hands, [and] are used to sleeping only four or five hours a night . . . it is a very real adjustment to blend into a three-piece suit schedule, which, while comfortable to many, is new, restrictive, seemingly less productive, and maddeningly less intoxicating.” As Jamison puts it, manic-depression “destroys the basis of rational thought.” If lithium restores it, then it is highly significant that many patients who have experienced being “irrational” refuse lithium as a kind of agent of the rational/modern, despite the agonies the alternative can produce.

Does the shift in the value attached to manic-depression actually amount to redefinition of the category, or is it just a swapping of the valence from negative to positive? If this shift continues, will it happen with a sense that meanings are constructed and so are changeable, or will it happen with a sense that a deeper, unchanging reality is being revealed? At this point in my research, these have to remain open questions.

MANIA IS GROUNDED

Outside these contexts in which mania is pushed off its pins, so to speak, there are other domains in which mania is gaining concreteness, timelessness, and facticity by being attached to particular physical causes that lie behind and explain its presence. It is well known that the effort to identify material causes for manic-depression is proceeding actively on many fronts, focusing mostly on genes and neurotransmitters. The mainstream press tells us scientific research will soon turn up “real physical correlates of eccentric behaviors.” 33

A number of scholars have shown how profoundly physical entities like genes and the DNA they are made of affect both scientific and cultural concepts of life, the body, and the person: summed up in what Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee call “the power of the gene.” 34 For example, an ongoing study at Johns Hopkins Medical School is designed to identify the genes responsible for manic-depression. Psychiatric histories and blood will be collected from volunteers and their families back two generations. When I talked to the person who screens prospective participants, she talked about the blood.

I ask: What’s the blood for?

In order to look at the genetic material, what we’re trying to do is to compare within and across families because we are collecting several
families, and try to find out what individuals have in common who are affected versus those who are not affected and to try to find out what is making one individual have the disorder while the other doesn’t.

And that would be something in the blood?

Yes, yes. We compare the genetic information.

Has this never been found before?

What we are looking for is the gene. We actually haven’t found the gene; what we have found is an area of a certain size that we think the gene is located within so we are collecting additional families to sort of narrow down that spot on the chromosome that we think may contain one of the genes for the disorder.

Kay Jamison makes clear the double-edged character of knowledge such as this study might produce. If manic-depression could have its genetic location specified, might there not be a rush to cleanse the species of these abnormal individuals with their defective genes? She argues that the sterilization or killing of the mentally ill during the Third Reich and the sterilization of the mentally ill during the eugenicist movement in the United States both provide chilling precedents. Studies in both these regimes considered whether to target manic-depressives particularly aggressively, and both recommended against it because manic-depressives were disproportionately found in the professional and higher occupational classes. Tactfully accepting both the primacy of genetic causation and the applicability of natural selection to human populations, Jamison argues that the genes involved in manic-depression confer advantages on both individual and society, though like sickle-cell anemia, the cost to particular individuals may be great. Rather than challenging the assumptions involved in claims of genetic causation, she simply asserts that the genes responsible are important to the evolutionary strategies of our species.

A recent issue of Newsweek features a photo of Robin Williams on the cover alongside the headline “Are we all a little crazy?” The issue stresses that the view of mental health in psychiatry is moving toward a continuum model in which there are many intermediate states surrounding any pathological condition. Neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky is quoted: “geneticists will come to the aid of psychiatrists in this debate... The idea of a continuum represents a major cognitive breakthrough for genetics. It suggests that a middling genetic load [of mental illness genes] gives you a personality disorder, a lighter one gives you a personality quirk and a still lighter one gives you mainstream America.” One of the researchers at Johns Hopkins, Francis J. McMahon, weighs in on the new evidence that at least five genes are associated with manic-depression: “It may be that if you have only one gene, . . . you might be more susceptible to mood elevations that let you meet deadlines through a burst of activity or lead your business team across the finish line. The gene might be over-represented among artists and creative types.” The journalist points out that “Robin Williams has described his deep depressions; any fan can see his mania, but someone with all 5 manic-depressive genes might be too buffeted by mood swings to function.” The natural selection argument is reiterated in the context of asserting that many “disorders” serve useful functions for society. “Genes associated with mental illness might, in fact, keep society supplied with the personality types it needs.” A neuroscientist explains that people with schizotypal personality disorder, for example, gravitate toward solitary occupations. “They are the lighthouse keepers and fire tower rangers.” The article concludes, “when everyone is crazy, no one will be.”

The link between the array of genes and the array of psychic conditions happens by means of translated codes. In his recent trade book called A Mood Apart, physician Peter Whybrow explains: “My suspicion is that we will discover not one but a variety of genetic variations, each of which can predispose an individual to bipolar illness, including the milder forms such as seasonal affective disorder or the hyperthymia of great achievement. Probably each variant will be responsible for a slightly unusual genetic code in the library of instructions that builds the machinery of the neuron.” It is as if the text of the mind were simply and directly read off the genes.

Earlier, I said it was not clear whether the change of valence attached to the category manic-depression entailed the notion that its meanings slip with their context. But it is clear that the sliding scale of genes lying behind manic-depression does not include any such slipperiness. If every genetic variant, from only one gene present to many, is thought to cause specific kinds of behavior, then the category itself is only being divided into finer parts; it is not being redefined by its context.

There is a tension in the contemporary meanings of mania: on the one hand, since its value is shifting, there is a sense in which its meaning seems indeterminate, constructed by the social context of our times. On the other hand, mania as a product of real physical causes seems increasingly a concrete and timeless fact. In my ongoing project, my purpose is not to dissipate this tension. Rather I want to shed light on why the manic has become such an active site of cultural attention in both these arenas.
THE CATEGORY “MANIA” IN ITS CONTEXT

What is there about mania that makes it a candidate for abnormality in the first place? The concept entails a degree of madness, loss of reason, or irrationality that is explicit in psychiatric definitions. In a manic state, the person does too much talking and assaulting, is overactive mentally and physically, has inadequate focus and garbled, delusional, or inexplicable speech. But mania is not just extreme emotions—enthusiasm, hilarity, anger, and so on. Psychiatric case studies and films of manic states (including actors simulating mania for the purpose of training medical students to identify it and actors like Robin Williams harnessing mania for comic effect) make it plain that in a manic state, it is as if the person has a crowd of people inside him or her all at the helm at once. But rather than the person being split between different selves who calmly take turns, the manic parts seem to jostle each other wildly for control. Aggressive, mocking, conciliatory, humorous, challenging, bragging, suspicious, hostile, expansive, open, belligerent, rejecting, fearful—every imaginable stance is enacted. Fear of the irrational set loose by a crowd is an old theme in Western history: at the turn of the century Le Bon laid it out: “Isolated, a person may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings.” Of course, Le Bon participated in the Eurocentrism and racism of his day in likening crowd behavior to “primitive” behavior. In keeping with his time, he saw the irrationality apparently unleashed by crowds as characteristics of “women, savages, and children”: “impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments... are almost always observed in beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution.”

There is certainly a high degree of suggestibility in all forms of mania, but perhaps, interpreted as exhibiting a style of speech behavior, a person with a crowd inside would seem less bizarre. In Robin Williams’s stand-up comic routines, there is always some connection among the things said, but it is made through a kind of slipping: a word leads to an association, an object is put to every possible use, everything is pushed to yield its meaning. Robin Williams’s comic style is part of a tradition that includes Jonathan Winters and Don Rickles; there is no doubt it is something worked for through discipline and training. Mania may not in any way be a result of training in this sense, but I would still suggest that we could say, after Jakobson, “Every mania is a style.”

One way to understand the attention being paid to mania is to see it as a “colonizing” or “cultivating” of the irrational—the “culture” of mania as if the mind were a petri dish. If so the cultivating is probably related to certain ways commonsense conceptions of rationality are changing. The bounded, unitary, singular self seems to be giving way, allowing various kinds of separation within the self to be considered “normal” and sometimes desirable. These separations include disassociation of the self into parts, each of which has some autonomy from the others; experiencing the body as an object; experiencing the body as an object that shifts its dimensions in time and space.

Another possible reason for the colonization of the irrational in marginal people is that certain forms of irrationality that are in fact an intrinsic part of daily life in late capitalism are emerging into visibility. Perhaps the irrationality of the market and what you have to do and be to succeed in it are being more openly recognized. To be good at playing this crazy game, it helps to be a little crazy. “Rational choice” contains within it “irrational” impulses and desires. From this vantage point, we can look at the excess in Ted Turner as capitalist and as yacht captain (depicted and experienced as talent) as signs of apprehension: greater knowledge of what capitalism entails and greater fear of what it may require of people. A book that analyzes the workings of late capital is even called One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism. It is filled with references to “manic capital,” oscillating with depression, and the calamitous consequences of both. The drop and rapid recovery of the stock exchange in October 1997 inspired a flurry of domain-crossing remarks in the business news, such as “If Wall Street were a person we’d think he was mentally ill.” Similarly, during the market swings of late summer 1998, a story from the New York Times business section was entitled “A Manic-Depressive Market Befuddles Even the Professionals”: “Moodiness like this used to be an occasional thing in American stocks. Now, going from euphoria to depression is de rigueur. The trouble is, these market gyrations have consequences: they are highly distressing to investors’ psyches and exceedingly costly to their portfolios.”

For mania to be colonized this way—for it to become an asset for Wall Street and its employees—it must seem stable and real. Abbott Labs would ask nothing less before investing in drugs to dampen mania in some people or heighten it in others. But simultaneously mania must shift its meaning to somehow traverse the huge divide between the irrational and rational, either making the irrational come to seem rational or forging a new category of sense somewhere in between.
Out of this dual movement arises the tension I have begun to lay out between mania, the style and mania, the genetic condition.

CLOSING REMARKS

The feminist paradigm has had a powerful effect on scholars in science studies far outside the traditional boundaries of “feminism.” As one example, a conference in 1993 focused on “cyborg anthropology,” a field that examines the argument that “human subjects and subjectivity are crucially as much a function of machines, their relations, and their information transfers as they are machine producers and operators.”

Although the papers presented were on topics as diverse as PET scans, the human genome project, Prozac, the immune system, high-energy physics, and engineering education, all participants were basically in agreement that the field would weld together cultural anthropology, studies of science and technology, and feminism. Feminism was central because it would be able to “stimulate widespread awareness of many different sources of stratification and hierarchy within science and technology, including race, class, and ethnicity.... feminist studies have detailed the ways in which science’s claims to neutrality effectively generate hierarchies of power and control. [Feminism] ... will insure that Cyborg Anthropology stays attuned to the diverse sources and forms of power constituted through science and technology and to alternative methodological strategies for providing analytical and critical understanding.”

Feminism has bequeathed to anthropological and cultural studies of science the insight that efforts to understand the production of knowledge need to be situated at junctures between scientific and technological research settings, on the one hand, and related cultural settings that reveal changing concepts of self and society, on the other. Extended to the social sciences, and to fields like the sciences of the mind that straddle the natural/social science divide, this approach can hope to illuminate the lines of power, stretching from one edge of a cultural field to the other, that are making something like mania seem at once more real, fixed, and known and more fictional, unstable, and unknowable.

NOTES

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5. “Given the prevailing binarized or dichotomized categories governing Western reason and the privilege accorded to one term over the other in binary pairs (mind over body, culture over nature, self over other, reason over passion, and so on), it is necessary to examine the subordinated, negative, or excluded term, body, in the unacknowledged condition of the dominant term, reason. . . . The body has been and still is closely associated with women and the feminine, whereas the mind remains connected to men and the masculine” (Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994], 215).


7. Ibid., 11.

8. For a recent representative collection of papers, see Floyd R. Davis and Joseph Dumit, eds., Cyborg Babies: From Techno-Sex to Techno-Tots (New York: Routledge, 1998).


13. Ibid., xiv.

14. Ibid., 49.


17. Jamison, Unquiet Mind. Most people I met in support groups during fieldwork felt they had little in common with the tormented, but creative, geniuses of Jamison’s account. What is interesting to me about the reappearance of the old theme of the mad genius in this context is the implication that a certain amount of madness is good for, even essential for, everyone’s survival in the contemporary world.

18. Ibid., 3.
19. Ibid., 105.
20. Ibid., 267–70.
22. Jamison, Unquiet Mind, 80.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 149.
27. Ibid., 150.
28. Goodwin and Jamison, Manic-Depressive Illness, 168.
31. Patient narrative, collected by author.
32. Jamison, Unquiet Mind, 91, 92.
33. Sharon Begley, “Is Everybody Crazy?” Newsweek, Jan. 26, 1998, 50–56. In a medical text on mania, Belmaker and van Pragg make the point that whatever role each factor is finally given, we are zeroing in on things that are physical causes. To describe both the certainty of what is known and the uncertainty that remains, they suggest an analogy: we know manic-depression is a fruit but “we don’t know whether it’s a citrus that will divide itself into separable sections or an apple that we must divide along arbitrary lines” (R. H. Belmaker and H. M. van Pragg, “Mania: Disease Entity or Symptom Cluster?” in Mania: An Evolving Concept, ed. R. H. Belmaker and H. M. van Pragg [Jamaica, NY: Spectrum Publications, 1980], 1–5).
35. Interview conducted on Nov. 2, 1998, at Johns Hopkins Medical School.
38. Ibid., 53, 55.
40. In Bakhtin’s terms, the language of genetics is referential: it is “direct,” “unmediated,” and “referentially oriented” in that it “recognizes only itself and its object, to which it strives to be maximally adequate. . . . Speakers of “direct, unmediated discourse” . . . do not take into account the already-spoken-about quality of the object or, at least, not in a way that implicitly challenges the authority of their own speech. . . . they simply name their referents” [Gary S. Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaist (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 148].
41. Le Bon, The Crowd, 12, 16.
46. The conference papers were subsequently published in Gary Lee Downey and Joseph Dumit, eds., Cyborgs and Citadels: Anthropological Interventions in Emerging Sciences and Technologies (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1997).