As we have seen, administrative structures are designed to address particular problems in particular contexts. This has meant that they are usually set up to address problems other than women’s issues, in contexts that tend not to feature sexual inequality. According to Staudt (1997, 10), “Gender is a social construct that differentiates men and women in ways that become embedded and institutionalized in the political and bureaucratic authority of the state. Women rarely have voice in conceptualizing such institutional forms.” Thus, women’s general powerlessness at key historical moments of institutional design partially accounts for the survival of an administrative structure that obscures their concerns.

We noted above that neoinstitutionalists emphasize that institutions are organizations, and that the framework in which new problems are approached will likely be determined largely by the usual way of organizing and approaching things. In her discussion of policies on domestic violence, Busch (1992) similarly argues that the form of policy response to domestic violence depends partially on which problems existing institutional structures already address. For example, if a health policy bureaucracy already exists, then the problem will be understood as a health problem. In the United States, where there is a highly developed criminal justice system, violence against women is taken up as a criminal justice problem. We can extend her argument by observing that in European countries, where the social-distributive apparatus is more developed, violence-against-women policy will tend to focus more on provision of services to victims and less on criminal justice response. Busch explains that this feature of bureaucratic response precludes a comprehensive policy to address violence against women because the problem will necessarily be fragmented and the response uncoordinated—and probably partial—as it is taken up by one or another of these administrative structures. Hoskyns (1996) argues that the efforts of the women’s bureau of the EU to raise the issue of racism against migrant workers were partially thwarted by the absence of any administrative unit that could take primary responsibility for the problem (an observation to which I will return in later chapters). Thus, it is clear that the current administrative structure of many states lacks the policy capabilities required to address feminist issues effectively.

This suggests that altering the administrative structure of the state will improve policy responsiveness. Introducing new categories, such as administrations that focus on women and permit coordination of policies across existing administrative categories, can facilitate the formulation of policies to promote the status of women. Where women’s movements have introduced women’s issues as categories of the administrative structure of state and policy, we would expect political institutions to be more effective in implementing feminist policy.

Indeed, such a rationale lies behind the creation of many women’s policy agencies. Hoskyns (1996, 122) notes that efforts in Ireland and Germany to implement gender equality directives adopted by the EU led to “an increase in the bureaucratic structure around equality policy, and to facilities which at a certain level at least made it easier for women’s issues to be articulated.” In Germany, the Arbeitsstaub Frauenpolitik (working group on women’s issues) of the Federal Ministry for Youth, the Family, and Health was increased in size and given both cross-departmental authority and responsibility for funding women’s projects and disseminating information. In Ireland, the Employment Equality Agency, an office focusing more narrowly on employment equity, was established in 1977 in response to the EU directives. Similarly, some governments originally created their gender office or women’s bureau to help prepare for international women’s rights conferences.

Women’s policy agencies are one way of creating state institutions that reflect women’s perspective, as defined in chapter 3. A women’s policy machinery can address issues of concern to women (such as violence) without segmenting such problems into their health, criminal justice, and other aspects. Thus, women’s policy machineries introduce the category “women” as a legitimate subject—indeed, a priority—of policy. It follows that violence against women will be more effectively addressed where there is a women’s policy machinery.

Virtually all of the countries in this study had created a women’s policy machinery of some kind by 1994. There is great variety of form among these institutions: some are women’s desks stationed in lowly subdepartments, as in Botswana; other policy machineries, such as those in Canada and Belgium, consist of a complex array of advisory bodies and agencies focused directly on service provision. Some policy machineries, such as that in Australia, include mechanisms through which women’s movement activists can be included in national policymaking processes. Only Nauru had no women’s policy machinery at all.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, these diverse institutional measures do not appear to have had a uniform effect on policy responsiveness to violence against women. Indeed, the very fact that nearly every country has such a policy machinery should suggest to us that its mere existence will not have much explanatory power. As Malloy (1999) notes, “conventional bureaucratic wisdom dismisses most agencies as peripheral to actual decision-making and irrelevant except as external political symbols” (Malloy 1999, 268).
As we have noted, in order to improve policy responsiveness, the women's policy agency must have sufficient power to coordinate policy across a variety of sectors. The mere presence of a women's policy machinery may not be as important as having an effective women's policy machinery. A token advisor at a low level in the department of sports and tourism should not be expected to have the same effect on policy as a women's office that has strong support from and interaction with women's movements, considerable resources, and a mandate to use those resources to comment across departmental divisions on a wide range of government policy issues of concern to women. Indeed, we should not expect minimal, superficial reforms to have any effect at all, but we should expect a major institutional reform to have some effect. But how can we determine which reforms are likely to be effective and which are not?

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WOMEN'S POLICY AGENCIES

Mazur and Stetson (1995) have developed a typology of women's policy machineries based on their cross-national analysis of women's policy machineries and equal employment opportunity policy in twelve countries (fig. 5-1). For each women's policy machinery, they ask whether the institution has the capacity to influence policy outcomes and whether it provides access to women's advocacy organizations. Having categorized the agencies according to these criteria, Mazur and Stetson ask what determines these two features of women's policy machineries. They examine the impact of organizational forms, political culture, politics of establishing the agency, and the form of the women's movement. Since we have already discussed the last three, let us stay focused here on the first explanatory factor, organizational form. Mazur and Stetson observe that a women's policy machinery is more effective when it has broad, cross-sectoral responsibility than when it has a primarily advisory capacity or is at a subdepartmental level, as is, for example, the Women's Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor. While this is an interesting finding, Mazur and Stetson do not offer a theoretical account of why this is so.

The women's policy offices that Mazur and Stetson judge to be generally effective in influencing policy appear to have had some positive impact on government response to violence against women. Effective women's policy offices in Australia and France were apparently important in developing a response to violence against women. Indeed, in France, the main policy initiatives in this area seem to have stemmed from the work of the feminist activists who staffed the Ministère des Droits de la Femme (MDF) until 1986.

Mazur (1995b) charts the ministry's influence as declining after 1985. But it was between 1980 and 1984 that the largest number of policy initiatives on violence against women were adopted in France. Similarly, in Australia, the establishment of the Women's Affairs Section in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1974, the expansions of the Section in 1975 and 1977, and, finally, the establishment of the Office of the Status of Women in 1982 preceded, and may have facilitated, the Australian government's response.

Mazur and Stetson develop their assessments of effectiveness based on their measures of the impact of women's policy offices on equal employment policy. This study of violence-against-women policies suggests that the differential outcomes observed by Mazur and Stetson may be an artifact of the policy issue they chose to examine (John and Cole 2000). For example, Elman (1995) notes that the Swedish policy agency Jämställdhetsenheten, or JÄMÖ (The Equality Affairs Division in the Ministry of Public Administration), was "conspicuously absent" from the development of policies to address violence against women. Similarly, the Norwegian Equal Status Council, categorized as a high-access, high-policy-impact agency by Mazur and Stetson, has had little impact on policymaking with respect to abortion or crisis centers, two issues that have been very important to the women's movement (Van Der Ros 1994). Conversely, Canada's "low-influence" women's policy machinery played a critical role in developing policies to address violence against women. In Ireland, the women's policy machinery, although fragmented and somewhat haphazard, successfully promoted the
issue of violence against women, resulting in major policy reform between 1994 and 1997. Yet Mazur and Stetson judge the women's policy machinery in Ireland to be among the least effective of the twelve cases. Similarly, despite the “high-influence, high-access” machineries in Denmark and the Netherlands, these countries have adopted fewer policies to address violence against women. Thus, three of the four countries where Mazur and Stetson judge the women's policy machinery to be most effective—the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark—are not the countries that are developing the most progressive and comprehensive policies to address violence against women. Of these three, the most responsive is Norway, but the very effective policy machineries in the Netherlands and Denmark have done very little to address violence against women.

Many of the women's policy agencies Mazur and Stetson identify are, in fact, equal opportunity offices within the ministry for employment. It is no wonder that offices designed to monitor equal opportunity have a greater impact on that specific policy area than offices that have a broader mandate. For example, it is not surprising that the Netherlands' Department for the Coordination of Equality Policy, situated in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, had a greater effect on equal employment policy than did Status of Women Canada, which had the broader responsibility of developing Canada's plan of action for the Decade of Women (1975–85). By 1982, Status of Women Canada had partially or fully implemented 96 percent of the plan. The main complaint about Status of Women Canada was that women's groups had too little input into the process. Yet Mazur and Stetson characterize Canada's women's policy agencies as high access and low influence.

These discrepancies suggest that developing a typology of effectiveness based on examination of the impact of women's policy machineries on a single policy area is not a good way to gauge the general effectiveness of agencies across countries. Rather than reasoning backward from policy outcomes, it seems better to develop a theoretical account of institutional effectiveness—of what would make women's policy machineries effective—and then use that account to examine whether these institutions are in fact effective.

**WHEN WOMEN’S POLICY AGENCIES ARE EFFECTIVE**

Mazur and Stetson categorize women's policy agencies according to whether they have an impact on policy. They point out that the agencies that had centralized, cross-sectoral approaches to promoting gender equality into mainstream policy were the most effective (1995, 288). These agencies must be set up to coordinate women's policies in an authoritative manner; that is, they must have the positional or institutional power to direct policymaking across a number of departments; a subdepartmental desk in a low-ranking ministry is unlikely to be an effective policy machinery. Similarly, an agency with few or no resources will be unable to carry out the wide-ranging yet detailed policy analysis required. In her study of equal opportunity programs, Cockburn (1991, 234) argues that for policies in this area to be effective, the administrators must be housed in a “high and secure place” in the hierarchy. These observations suggest that a women's policy machinery must have a degree of independence, some of its own resources, and positional authority in order to be consistently effective.

Independence is also important in order for the women's policy agency to be able to influence the government agenda. As long as the agency is merely a subdepartmental unit, women's concerns will be represented only as part of a laundry list of departmental activities, and there is no guarantee that they will receive prominence in the overall government agenda. However, where a women's policy machinery is an independent body that can put forward its own agenda for integration into the government agenda, the exclusion of women's issues cannot occur accidentally in the aggregating of ministerial preferences. For example, if a women's issue is in second place on each department's agenda, and the overall decision agenda takes only the first issue from each department, then women's issues will be excluded, even though they were given relatively high priority within each department. If a women's ministry or commission has equal stature with other departments, then the most important issue to women might have a chance of getting on the government's list.

Women's policy machineries improve government response to violence against women because they make it possible to address women's issues as such, rather than mainly as issues of health, labor, or criminal justice. This benefit of a women's policy machinery is lost if it is merely a subdepartment, since the women's issue must fit into the policy orientation of the rest of the department in order to be addressed effectively.

Where women's policy agencies have the institutional power to review and comment on government policies across sectors, they can provide an important corrective to male bias in other areas of the institution by providing women's perspective on policies before they are enacted. In some cases, a process for “gender-based” analysis can be incorporated into all policy processes (Beveridge, Nott, and Stephen 1998). In Australia in 1976, women's offices were set up in every department to analyze the gender impact of public policies, and these “satellite” offices were connected to a powerful central “hub” in the prime minister's office. In Canada, similarly,
EFFECTIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Mazur and Stetson (1995) as well as the neoinstitutionalists direct our attention to the relationship between political institutions and organized groups and activists. Above, we noted that access by women’s movements would be key to an institution’s effectiveness on issues of concern to women.

Malloy (1999) argues that state advocacy structures, or “agencies nominally designated to advance the status of collective social movements in public policy and society,” (267) operate under unique criteria for effectiveness. Bureaucratic notions of effectiveness suggest the ability to influence policy and to compel compliance with policy decisions inside and outside bureaucracies (268). But state advocacy structures such as women’s policy agencies also face considerable pressure from social movements to provide a voice for the movement inside government—to perform a representative function.

Indeed, many social movement activists express frustration that such structures do not reflect the “goals and diversity of the movement” (Malloy 1999; see also Sawer 1995; and Brownmiller 1999). One Canadian activist noted that many of the representatives on the federal government’s Canadian Panel to Address Violence Against Women were “tokens” of region and race and that they thus did not provide real representation. She noted:

The panel should be composed of representatives/delegates of women’s groups but it isn’t. Each of the members is on her and his own...the government announced them as members of groups and as tokens of certain groups of women. We insist on their accountability and we’ll support them only to the extent that they exercise that responsibility. But how the hell can Mobina Jaffer be expected to represent both [British Columbia’s] interests and the interests of immigrant women? (Lakeman 1991, 5)

Social movement activists and democratic theorists have expressed the concern that the institutionalization of movements in state advocacy structures necessarily results in co-optation and diffuses the movement (Dryzek 1990; Everett 1998; Gelb 1995; Naples 1998; Malloy 1999). Professionalization of activists, in this view, creates an elite class that quickly loses touch with its grassroots base (Everett 1998; cf. Sawer 1995). Ferguson (1984) argues that there are powerful forces that suppress dissent within bureaucracies. An internal agency whose role is to dissent and to criticize other government agencies will face considerable pressure to support the existing set of government priorities and policies. Many democrats report feeling caught in the middle between women’s movement demands and the internal demands of the bureaucracy (Sproule 1998; Sawer 1995).

Recent research suggests that it is possible to agitate for change within institutions (Katzenstein 1998; Sawer 1995; Gelb 1995; Reinelt 1995). Naples (1998) observes that anti-poverty activists in the United States have found that increasing opportunities for participation by grassroots activists can counteract antidemocratic tendencies in a bureaucracy. Matthews (1995) argues that feminist movement organizations in the United States avoided co-optation or deradicalization by building coalitions with other groups, both across groups of women and with labor, antipoverty, and civil rights groups. (See also Naples 1998; and Hoskyns 1996.)

Women’s policy machineries must include mechanisms of accountability to ensure that there is an independent source of pressure on the agency to maintain a critical stance toward government policy (cf. Dryzek 1990). Regular, public interaction between government officials and women’s movement activists may go some way toward counterbalancing internal bureaucratic pressures to limit participation by grassroots activists. Public consultations, for example, can ensure that lines of communication between professional and grassroots activists remain open. Such consultations have become a routine part of environmental policymaking in the United States. There is usually greater diversity among activists at the grassroots level than there is among professionals, who are more likely to be middle class and formally educated (Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999, 385). Thus, consultative relationships can improve the representative function of the women’s policy machinery by keeping bureaucrats better informed about, and thus better equipped to articulate, the goals and diversity of the movement. The extra visibility that public consultations can give to women’s movement demands can also strengthen the women’s policy machinery internally in terms of its dealings with other departments. They can refer to the demands of their constituency as the reason for making certain types of requests or demands themselves (Hoskyns 1996).

As noted, both Malloy (1999) and Mazur and Stetson (1995) identify access by women’s movements as an important aspect of the effectiveness of women’s policy agencies. In Costa Rica, the women’s policy machinery has been an important partner to the women’s movement in addressing vi-
violence against women, helping to organize demonstrations and fund crisis centers. Indeed, such access can be both formal and informal. Where access is through informal channels, it usually depends on good relations between women's movement representatives and individual bureaucrats in the policy agency. Thus, at some times and in some areas, women's movements may be very effective because the individuals with whom they ally within the policy machinery feel responsible to women's organizations (Mansbridge 1995). But if these individuals are removed, the policy agency can suddenly become less responsive and less connected to women's groups (Mazur 1995b).

If consultation with women's groups is a formal part of the policy agency, then access is likely to be less capricious and more uniform across policy areas and over time. It may be more difficult for new administrations (who may be hostile to women's groups) to shut women's organizations out of the policymaking process when formal, regularized channels for consultation exist.

Thus, effective women's policy machineries have (1) the independence and resources needed to formulate and implement aspects of a women's agenda; and (2) formalized channels of access for activists and organizations. Note that these criteria concern the design of institutions, not policy impact itself. The hypothesis is that institutions with these characteristics will be more effective. Thus, they should have a greater impact on policy processes than institutions without resources and independence.

The women's policy agencies in the thirty-six stable democracies in this study are categorized according to these criteria in figure 5-2. Only eight of the thirty-four agencies meet both criteria for effectivness: the policy machineries in Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Belgium, Venezuela, Portugal, and Germany.

We would expect that the countries having an effective women's policy machinery would have more comprehensive policies on violence against women. We can use statistical analysis to examine the relationship between the presence of an effective institution and responsiveness to violence against women, coding the governments in the top left-hand box 1 and the others 0.

The presence of an effective institution is associated with between two and four additional areas of government policy action (see table 5-1). Even in the context of a variety of other possible explanatory factors, an effective women's policy machinery stands out as the only one with a sizeable, significant association with a more comprehensive government response.

However, there is considerable variation in responsiveness among the countries in which an effective women's policy machinery has been established; the government of Venezuela failed to introduce even one initiative by 1994, while Canada and Australia had introduced all seven possible policy initiatives. So although it appears that effective women's policy machineries significantly affect policy responsiveness to violence against women, it is not clear under what conditions they will have such an effect. I turn to this question in the next chapter.

INSTITUTIONS IN FEMINIST POLICY ANALYSIS

Feminist analyses of the welfare state have not adequately explored the effects of variation in political institutional structures on policy. One group of explanations are what Duncan (1995) calls "gendered welfare state models." These models complement the typologies of welfare state regimes developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) with gendered measures of welfare.
Table 5-1: Coefficients, Dependent Variable = Scope of Government Response, 36 Countries, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model/Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/Effective women’s policy machinery</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Effective women’s policy machinery</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong, autonomous women’s movement</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women cabinet members</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/Strong, autonomous women’s movement</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective women’s policy machinery</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of development</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State development, such as the degree to which women are able to establish households without a male present (Orloff 1993). The problem with these models, as feminist critics have noted, is that they are descriptive rather than explanatory (Duncan 1995; Lewis 1993). They are mostly aimed at typologizing welfare state impacts rather than at delineating the dynamics of welfare state development. Moreover, these approaches tend to equate the state itself with policy outcomes. The outcomes of policies, such as variations in the wage gap between men and women, are taken as indicators of the kind of welfare state one is examining. Taking this approach makes it impossible to separate political institutions and social policy analytically, and thus also makes it impossible to ask what impact change in political institutions has on social policy.

Feminist sociological approaches still appear to collapse the state and social policy, and to give little analytic attention to the state itself. For example, one major approach to analyzing the gender systems refers to “gender contracts”: state policies are said to reflect historic compromises between gender groups. As Duncan (1995, 96) notes, “Rather than being a pre-eminent actor, the state reflects these contracts through its policies, rather than initiating them.” But the process by which policy outcomes come to reflect these historic compromises is not at all clear. Somehow, the state (which is again equivalent to policy here) reflects a form of social organization. Similarly, Walby (1990) identifies the state as one of six mechanisms that create male dominance over women. Although specific state policies may appear to undermine gender oppression, overall the patriarchal state works as part of a gender system that subordinates women. But, as I have argued throughout this book, sometimes state agencies are important forces for undermining male dominance and reinforcing women’s movements. Thus, feminist theorists need a more nuanced theory of public administrative structures and how they affect policies.

Recently, many feminist analysts have turned their attention to political institutions, providing us with important insights as to how institutions matter to women (Brown 1992; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Staudt 1997; Stetson and Mazur 1995). This work explores, for example, the effect of committee structures and women’s policy machineries on policy. Nevertheless, we still have no theoretical account of why some public bureaucracies are more responsive to women’s concerns than others. Thus, feminist theory still cannot answer a key question raised by the results of this study: why do women’s policy agencies make governments more responsive to violence against women?

I have argued that political institutions, unless they are reformed, tend to reflect the perspective and interests of historically dominant groups. This is because these political institutions have been designed and shaped by members of privileged classes or castes. But this bias is a contingent product of historical processes, not a necessary or permanent feature of political institutions. Biases can be at least partially ameliorated by changing the language and categories of government and the distribution of resources within government.

This possibility for change explains why the creation of effective women’s policy agencies makes governments more responsive to violence against women. Women’s policy machineries provide a base for policy research, for critical review of policy, and for administration of policy issues—such as violence against women—that would otherwise fall into the cracks between government departments. The establishment of women’s policy machineries partially corrects for the organization of government around the priorities of historically dominant groups of men.

Institutions Matter for Comparative Social Policy

Conventional explanations for the development of social policy do not appear to provide much insight into the important issue of government policy on violence against women. For example, as I noted in chapter 2, policy
development in this area is not linear. Policies are adopted and then canceled. Legal reforms are revoked, and funding is withdrawn. In times of fiscal restraint and economic recession, policies on violence are expanded. This suggests that policy on violence against women is not a simple response to economic changes, and that it does not follow a universal pattern of convergence. Indeed, there is only a very weak relationship between level of development and government responsiveness to violence against women.

Nor is policy a direct product of conflict among social groups (Korpi 1978; Bock and Thane 1991). As we have seen, political institutions are critical to determining the scope of policies on violence against women. In Italy and the United States, a well-organized social group (women) agitated for national policy action on violence against women without much success for nearly twenty years. Similar action elsewhere produced policy responses much sooner. Thus, social conflict alone cannot explain policy development.

My analysis suggests that institutional factors made the difference. Changes in the structure of political institutions made some governments more responsive to women’s movements than others. This suggests that the structure of public administration is of primary importance for understanding the development of social policy.

GENDER AFFECTS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

Examining how social structures of gender shape institutional processes provides a more complete explanation for variation in policies on violence against women. Specifically, we understand that institutions are likely to be biased against women’s issues and concerns unless they are reformed. This is true because social norms, practices, and laws regarding the relationship between the masculine and the feminine (gender) become reflected in the organization of political institutions. Where these relations are unequal, that inequality is also reflected in institutional structures that formalize, for example, the notion of a breadwinner (male) as distinct from a primary caregiver (female). Creating an effective women’s policy machinery helps to ameliorate the bias in a public administrative structure that is not organized around women’s concerns.

Note that this is not a question of the number of women in political office, nor is it a question of providing access points for social movements. Rather, the point is that the capacity of government to respond is curtailed in relation to a specific group—women. If the account I have provided is correct, it is likely that administrative structures are in some respects biased against other marginalized groups, such as the poor and ethnic or racial minorities. Historical and current relations among groups shape government capacities. The imprint of these group relations on political institutions creates group-specific institutional constraints. In other words, institutional effectiveness varies according to which group’s concerns are being examined. This calls into question the neoinstitutionalist assumption that there are group-neutral institutional capacities (such as information gathering).

CONCLUSION

It appears that institutional reforms can greatly improve policy responsiveness to violence against women. Neither feminist theory nor neoinstitutionalist theories of policymaking alone can account for this finding. By combining and extending these bodies of theory, I have shown that political institutions are gendered, that is, they are implicated in creating and sustaining relations between the masculine and the feminine.

More importantly, institutional reforms can make political institutions more responsive to issues of concern to women and to social movements more generally. This suggests that political institutions ought to be given a more central place in feminist theory, and that theories of institutions ought to attend to the ways that gender and other axes of social stratification limit institutional effectiveness. If policy responsiveness to the most vulnerable groups (such as women, minorities, and the disabled) can be addressed by institutional reform, then we may have discovered a powerful new way to deepen democracy.
Chapter 5


2. Skocpol (1992) does consider the relationship between the women's movement and the state from the 1870s to the 1920s. Although her study is instructive, the historical period with which it is concerned precedes the time in which women enjoyed full civil and political rights. As Skocpol notes, this makes a difference for thinking about the development of gender-group consciousness, as well as for thinking about women's access to the state, and limits the applicability of these findings for the current discussion (which begins with second-wave feminism in countries where women have full civil and political rights).

3. For studies of violence against women policy that see the state as inherently inimical to feminist goals, see MacKinnon 1989; Busch 1992; Walker 1990; and Daniels 1997. For feminist state theorists who see the state in general as inimical to feminist concerns, see Brown 1981; Brown 1992; Fraser 1989; MacKinnon 1989; Abramovitz 1988; Borchardt and Siim 1987; and Elshain 1983. For critiques of this view, see Gordon 1990; Skocpol 1992; and Brush 1994.

4. Brown's examination (1992) of the bureaucratic mode of the state echoes this analysis, although it does not speak directly to the issue of violence against women.

5. Borchardt and Siim (1987) similarly equate the growth of the welfare state with the expansion of social provision and with increasingly generous social policies. Hantrais (1991) examines the attitude of the French welfare state towards women by studying how women are treated in social policy. For further examples, see Misra and Akins 1998; and Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997. In these studies, studying the welfare state just means studying policies.

Chapter 6

1. In 1982, the office was renamed the Office of the Status of Women. It was upgraded to a division and returned to the department of the prime minister and cabinet in 1983.

2. This claim is made by an independent scholar, but it appears in a report published by the government of Canada. I was unable to find studies confirming this fact. It does appear that Canada adopted this policy before the United States did (in 1994).

3. Data on policies on violence against women of marginalized subgroups are even harder to come by than data on policies on violence against women in general. Although this problem is not insurmountable in theory, I did not have the resources to undertake a comprehensive review of policies on violence against marginalized groups of women in all thirty-six countries in this study. In addition, we still need theoretical work to determine what sorts of vulnerable subgroups are comparable across countries. For example, can we compare the situation of African American women in the United States with the current situation of immigrant women in Europe? This conceptual work remains to be done (Beckwith 2000).

Chapter 7

1. Taylor-Goodby (1991) argues, similarly, that sustained criticism of state action as a means of solving public problems has resulted in a shift in analytic focus toward the private organization of interests in discussions of the welfare state, an organization